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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores specific conditions that may indicate a change in 
military-security relations between Brazil and the United States. Those conditions include 
Brazil's economic growth, both countries' leadership decisions on foreign policy, and 
Brazil's involvement in international security institutions. While one condition alone may 
not lead toward a definitive sign indicating future change of military-security relations, a 
great deal of these conditions collectively appear to show a framework of how to best 
forecast a potential change in military-security relations. Using these conditions, as 
researched between the United States and Brazil, as an initial focus with other emerging 
countries will enable policymakers to perhaps have a more effective way to develop 
greater military-security relations in order to facilitate greater cohesion and efforts to 
achieve global security. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 
1. Peace Operations ............................................................................4 
2. Economic Development and Relevance to Military-
Security Relations ..........................................................................8 
3. Foreign Policy of the Executive Leadership ..............................11 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................13 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................16 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE ............................18 
II. HOW DOES BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
INDICATE CHANGE IN MILITARY-SECURITY RELATIONS 
WITH THE UNITED STATES? ........................................................................19 
A. BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FROM 1980s 
DEBT CRISIS TO EMERGING WORLD LEADER BY THE 
2000s ..........................................................................................................19 
1. How Brazilian Economic Growth and Soft Power 
Translates into Hard Power ........................................................21 
2. Brazil Establishing Itself within the International Forum .......23 
B. BRAZIL’S MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH .................................................................................................25 
C. BRAZIL’S CHANGING SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES ....................................................................................31 
D. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF UNITAS .........................32 
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................34 
III. LEADERSHIP AS AN INDICATOR OF CHANGE IN MILITARY-
SECURITY RELATIONS ..................................................................................37 
A. PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY ............................................38 
1. Leadership and Legacy of Foreign Policy .................................39 
2. Autonomy in Leadership to Influence Foreign Policy ..............41 
3. Leadership Characteristics .........................................................42 
B. PRESIDENT COMPARISON ................................................................43 
1. President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) ...............................43 
2. President William J. Clinton (1994–2000) .................................48 
3. GEORGE W. BUSH (2001–2008) ..............................................51 
viii 
4. Barack Obama (2009–2016) ........................................................56 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................60 
IV. HOW DOES BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE 
OPERATIONS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN 
STATES INDICATE A CHANGE IN MILITARY RELATIONS 
WITH THE UNITED STATES? ........................................................................63 
A. BACKGROUND ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL .................................................................................................63 
B. BACKGROUND ON THE OAS.............................................................67 
C. A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON PEACE OPERATIONS ..........................69 
D. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNSC ...........................................70 
E. BRAZIL AND THE UNSC .....................................................................71 
1. Deeper Review of Brazil and the UNSC ....................................74 
2. Brazil’s Effort to Become an Official Member of the 
UNSC .............................................................................................76 
F. BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND UNSC PEACE 
OPERATIONS .........................................................................................78 
1. 1990–2000 Observations ..............................................................79 
2. 2000–2010 Observations ..............................................................81 
3. 2010–2016 Observations ..............................................................82 
G. BRAZIL AND UNITED STATES OPERATING WITHIN THE 
OAS ...........................................................................................................84 
H. ANALYSIS ...............................................................................................86 
1. On Involvement with the UNSC .................................................86 
2. On Involvement with the OAS ....................................................87 
I. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................88 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................89 
A. FINDINGS ................................................................................................90 
1. Hypothesis One: Findings and Remarks ...................................90 
2. Hypothesis Two: Findings and Remarks ...................................91 
3. Hypothesis Three: Findings and Remarks ................................92 
B. BRAZIL, UNITED STATES, AND GREAT POWER 
COMPETITION ......................................................................................93 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................95 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................97 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................105 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement between the United 
States and Brazil 2000–2016 .....................................................................27 
Figure 2. GDP per Capita of Brazil 1990–2017 ........................................................28 
Figure 3. Brazil’s Military Expenditure ....................................................................30 
Figure 4. Official Letter from President Clinton to Franco Provided by U.S. 
Department of State ...................................................................................46 
Figure 5. Absences Taken by Brazilian Presidents ...................................................55 
Figure 6. Peace Operations from 2008–2017 by Organization Provided by 
SIPRI ..........................................................................................................66 
Figure 7. OAS Peace Missions from 1990 to Present ...............................................68 
Figure 8. A Chronological Order of Brazilian Involvement in UNSC Peace 
Missions .....................................................................................................75 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
xi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my advisors, Dr. Darnton and Dr. Matei, for their guidance 
and support in the development of this thesis. Also, I would like to thank Mr. Thomas from 
the Graduate Writing Center for his guidance and ability to direct my thoughts and writing 
toward the development of this thesis. I would also like to thank my previous commanding 
officers for recommending me to participate in the Naval Postgraduate School program of 
security studies. Finally, I would like to thank my wife for supporting me personally 
throughout this endeavor.  
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The United States and Brazil, one a global power and the other an emerging power, 
have historically been intertwined in international discussions of economic influence, 
decisions made by their leaders on foreign policy, or their involvement in global peace 
initiatives. Brazil, as the largest country in both land mass and population in Latin America, 
can wield unwavering influence regionally by its evolving consumer demand as well as 
sustainment through newly explored biotechnology and crude oil reserves. Internationally, 
Brazil’s aspirational agenda to become another global power appears to offer the United 
States an opportunity to engage in more complex environments. One complex environment 
involves the military-to-military security relations, as an extension of both countries’ 
political agenda, where Brazil shows a multifaceted effort to enhance its legitimacy to 
achieve a near-peer relation with United States through enduring attempts at permanent 
membership in the United Nations. Brazil’s economic development has also been complex; 
efforts in the 21st century to join and influence global institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the association between Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa (BRICS), as well a multitude of other bilateral trade agreements, have facilitated 
growing interest globally. For Brazil, impactful decisions by its presidential leadership on 
involvement in peace operations and economic development policies have been criticized 
and materialized by coinciding leadership in Washington and are areas to be explored 
further. Given that these relationships have historical importance going back to World War 
II it is important to have a greater understanding of how to gauge the dynamics of military 
security relations between the two.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
What factors explain change in military security relations between the United States 
and Brazil? This thesis is only concerned with security cooperation between both countries’ 
military forces and excludes any agencies not directly involved with military activity. This 
thesis will cover the timeframe from President George H. W. Bush and Collor de Mello in 
1990 to the end of the Obama and Rousseff presidencies in 2016. The research is structured 
2 
to understanding how changes in military relations between the United States and Brazil 
are influenced by Brazil’s economic development, peace operations conducted by both 
countries, and leadership decisions in foreign policy.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The history between the United States and Brazil in military relations is one that’s 
rooted heavily in realism.1 The United States initially developed raw military power and 
partnerships with Brazil with the foresight of being a leader in great power competition 
globally and defending the western hemisphere from global threat.2 This research is 
relevant to the political and military leadership of both countries as it provides an 
understanding of how military relations can be strengthened and why ambitious attempts 
in the past three decades may have fallen short. Historical context shows that a pattern of 
relations between both countries has ebbed and flowed in the amount of intensity or 
moderation of global interaction both from the Cold War and debt crisis.3 The amount of 
engagement and relations developed by both the United States and Brazil is seemingly 
affected by domestic and national development as well as the creation of foreign policy 
that is decided upon by leadership of both countries. History has shown that relationships 
among countries are considered indispensable. A nation’s agenda of national security can 
often become a decision of isolation or autonomy. 
The United States sent a group of naval officers to Brazil in 1914 to assist the War 
College in the development and expansion of the Brazilian Navy.4 Why not lend an Army 
officer? The understanding of sea power being relevant, as Roosevelt’s White Fleet showed 
the world, underscores how strategically important Brazilian military relations are in the 
 
1 Realism: This concept is referring to one of three international relations paradigms and promoted by 
scholars like Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbs, and Carl Von Clausewitz. Another follower of realism 
ideals, though, been described as a neorealist, is Kenneth Waltz. Realism and neorealism refer to the 
international level of analysis and how a nation’s decisions are made in context to how they will affect or 
are affected by other nations.  
2 Sonny B. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil-United States Military Relations, 1945–1977 
(Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1996), 1–19. 
3 Joseph Smith, Brazil and the United States - Convergence and Divergence (Athens, GA: University 
of Georgia Press, 2010), 1–6. 
4 Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, 1–19. 
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eyes of the United States. Leaders in foreign policy and military strategy in the early 20th 
century sought ways to bolster security within the hemisphere by choosing to establish 
relations with Brazil and doing so resulted in stronger ties before and during World 
War II.5 Today, a focus on Great Power Competition (GPC) is again being developed 
among political and military leadership within the United States as well as the need to 
revisit ways each country can strengthen military relations.6 In this connection, this thesis 
is relevant because similar to the military ties that were expedited between the United 
States and Brazil at the beginning of World War II, we may again see a similar occurrence 
during today’s great power competition of global hegemony.  
Since sea travel and air travel have been continuously developed and improved 
upon, the distance between great powers has shrunk considerably. Previously, a World War 
II strategist looked at the importance of Brazil’s size, geographical location, and population 
to be an imperative asset to other superpowers outside of the hemisphere. Given the great 
power competition that the United States, Russia, and China are in once again, the time is 
ripe for renewed interest and relation with Brazil.7 This investigation aspires to shed light 
on how the relations can be influenced in the future and how the past three decades may 
have provided a best choice for both countries’ leadership to follow. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature shows that military-security relations can be broken down 
thematically into three areas, or indicators, which might explain the occurrence of changing 
relations between the United States and Latin America, to include Brazil. These indicators 
are: countries’ involvement in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the 
Organization of the American States (OAS) peace operations, economic development, and 
foreign policy decisions by countries leadership. 
 
5 Davis, 1–19. 
6 David A. Lake, “Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the 
United States,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2018): 237–270, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy010. Lake notes that historically, Great Power Competition as being a 
rivalry among global leaders in economic influence over zones and spheres around the globe.  
7 Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, 1–19. 
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1. Peace Operations 
The first indicator that affects military security relations that scholars agree on is 
the action taken in peace operations at the international and regional level by Brazil.8  
Historically, this indicator, according to scholars Britta Crandall, Abraham F. Lowenthal, 
and Monica Hirst primarily includes the Cold War and the spread of communism which 
had brought a desire from the United States to strengthen Latin American countries both 
politically as well as militarily.9 Early efforts post-World War II were made by countries 
in Latin America to gain United States resources to modernize their military especially 
Brazil, say authors Sonny Davis and Monica Hirst.10 Additionally, Hirst acknowledges the 
lasting effect of World War II and Cold War relations in which an implicit ideology or 
view of Americans that was left in the minds of Brazilians was most prominent in mutual 
relations.11 She continues in her work titled The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of 
Unmet Expectations, emphasizing the outcome of peace operations toward global conflicts 
had resulted in building alliances as far back as World War II.12 She also explains the 
lasting effect in views of Brazilians as a result of how America, post-Cold War, has moved 
to the notion that they are the leader of all hemispheric security peace operations and that 
countries within this hemisphere will defer to their decision.13 In other words, Hirst 
portrays America showing itself in a paternalistic relationship to those in Latin America.14 
Hirst notes the amount of military policy changes made in the ‘90s such as Brazil signing 
 
8 David R. Mares and Harold Trinkunas, Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global 
Influence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 85; Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, 
eds., The United States and Latin America in the 1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 596; Britta H. Crandall, Hemispheric Giants: The 
Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2011), 162; Mônica Hirst, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 108,112. 
9 Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 9; Abraham F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States 
and Latin America in the 1990s, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 27–49; 
Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 20–27. 
10 Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, 4–8; Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 24. 
11 Hirst, 20–31. 
12 Hirst, 22.  
13 Hirst, 113.  
14 Hirst, 113–15. 
5 
the Treaty on Conventional Weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Anti-
Land Mine Treaty, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.15 Harold Mares and 
Trinkunas agree with Hirst’s paternalistic belief.16 Crandall notes that this paternalistic 
belief was met with angst during the first Gulf war when Brazil decided not to engage in 
the coalition’s efforts and maintain a long-standing tradition of respecting sovereignty.17 
Hirst also contends that Brazil’s refusal to participate in the Gulf war was caused by 
Brazil’s concern with sovereignty, which hindered closer U.S. and Brazil military-security 
relations.18  
In this connection, scholars Mares and Trinkunas compliment Monica Hirst’s view 
by stressing that Brazil tends to follow the United Nations’ policies on authorized military 
interaction and has a tendency to favor soft power.19 The two authors go on by stressing 
that the importance of soft power and operating under multinational institutions is the 
policy Brazil follows vehemently in missions developed by following the United Nations 
under chapter six “which requires agreement by the parties in conflict before deploying a 
mission and specific rules limiting engagement for the troops.”20 Mares and Trinkunas 
additionally acknowledge that achieving soft power has led the primary purpose of military 
toward achieving two goals. One goal is the easing of influence from great powers as well 
as an aggrandizement of their own military presence globally through “scientific and 
technological development.”21 The other goal is to become a more influencing role through 
international institutions such as the UN Security Council and not be in a position to adapt 
to decisions made on their behalf.22 These goals contradict Hirst’s emphasis of Brazil’s 
 
15 Hirst, 30.  
16 Mares and Trinkunas, 60.  
17 Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 165. 
18 Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 113. 
19 Mares and Trinkunas, 87,99.  
20 Mares and Trinkunas, 99. 
21 Mares and Trinkunas, 87. 
22 Mares and Trinkunas, 87. 
6 
interest in developing military-security relations being a result of national interest on behalf 
of the United States.23  
Additionally, Mares and Trinkunas acknowledge multiple occasions where Brazil 
had given military personnel for peacekeeping operations (PKO) under the direction of the 
United Nations.24 Doing so resulted in a positive light among relations to the United States 
as it would show that Brazil was taking a leading role in efforts to grow as a hemispheric 
power and could project itself abroad or within the region. Projecting itself as a more 
sizable force, notes Mares and Trinkunas, would essentially lessen the strain on the United 
States to maintain global dominance on all military affairs.25 The scholars also maintain 
that the United States “intervention in Iraq, Libya, and Syria violate international rules.”26 
Brazil believes that structured organizational institutions should produce military-led 
engagements which are agreed by multiple parties as noted previously by Mares and 
Trinkunas. The United States intervention in those wars appeared to have threatened that 
structure. The scholars’ remarks seem to allude to the fact that Brazil enjoys having the 
large military power of the United States to defend against hemispheric threats that are 
deemed to be existential, but any threats that would improve only the interest of the United 
States seem to be contentious. 
Over the last decade, some academics have viewed global peace operations, 
displayed through efforts to thwart terrorism as the premise for establishing new relations 
among both countries.27 Mares and Trinkunas have shown a distinction in what has 
become to be known as “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP) by Brazil. Responsibility 
while Protecting is in contrast to what is widely promoted among the northern half of the 
western hemisphere, which is the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). Mares and Trinkunas 
continue by contending that consideration taken by Brazil for Responsibility while 
 
23 Hirst, 52. 
24 Mares and Trinkunas, 100. 
25 Mares and Trinkunas, 101. 
26 Mares and Trinkunas,103.  
27 Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 110; Mares and Trinkunas, Aspirational Power, 103. 
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Protecting explains the country’s sidelining itself from institutionally authorized use of 
hard power under the auspice of following a policy of rendering security solely for those 
instances deemed of humanitarian necessity.28  
On the same note, author Britta Crandall, in Hemispheric Giants: the 
Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations, viewed the lack of Brazilian peace 
operations in the Gulf War as a “missed opportunity” in advancing military-security 
relations as it believed the importance of the mission was not in the country’s best 
interest.29 Crandall does note that lost opportunities in advancing relations occurred 
beyond the Gulf War, that during the Cold War missed opportunities over security concerns 
and unachieved trade agreements had influenced Brazil’s decisions in joining peace 
operations within the United Nations.30 Like Brazil’s stance on participation during the 
Gulf War, Britta’s remarks also contrast with Mares and Trinkunas as well as Hirst in their 
response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States by showing immediate 
support being influenced by the national interest of the United States.31 She also 
acknowledges that relations had fizzled away in response to President Bush’s priority of 
terrorism.32 The fizzling of relations does align with Hirst’s emphasis on Brazil being again 
hindered by approaching military-security relations within “multilateral boundaries” which 
led Brazil to again choose not to engage in Afghanistan and Iraq.33 
Another group of scholars highlight that Brazil’s participation in the global war on 
terror remains stifled by multilateral agreements. In The United States and Brazil: A Long 
Road of Unmet Expectations, Hirst has noted Brazil’s decision to participate in UN 
 
28 Mares and Trinkunas, 103.; While Mares and Trinkunas acknowledge the literature that views 
global conflict or crisis displayed through terrorism, as the premise for establishing new relations among 
both countries, have shown a distinction in what has become to be known as “Responsibility while 
Protecting” (RwP) by Brazil. RwP is in contrast to what is widely promoted among the northern half of the 
western hemisphere (and the UNSC), which is the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).  
29 Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 165. 
30 Crandall, 8. 
31 Crandall, 174. 
32 Crandall, 174. 
33 Crandall,174.  
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Security Council initiatives, as well as the development of the Brazilian Defense Ministry, 
has brought the two countries closer by means of joint military engagement and 
cooperation.34 In contrast to Hirst remarks are comments from Hal Brands in his book, 
published by the Strategic Studies Institute, titled Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy, 
in which he describes unilateral actions by the United States to be a driver of divergence 
in relations and that greater autonomy and self-sustainment in military capability is a 
resulting outcome.35  
The authors presented held their perspectives on the connection between global 
conflict and relations to result in a divergence or convergence. It appears that global 
conflict would bring both countries to strengthen their communications over intentions and 
capabilities. Noted by Hirst were Brazil’s rampant treaty signing and alignment with 
United States. Other outcomes produced a minimal transparency between both countries 
exemplified by Brazil’s engagement with the United Nations security council, while 
backed by the United States, appeared to be view by the United States as taking the sideline 
to conflict. More importantly, it also appears that given the notion that Brazil has no 
significant external threats, any global conflict and interest evoked, would be that of the 
United States which allows Brazil to pick and choose how they want to engage.  
2. Economic Development and Relevance to Military-Security Relations 
Many authors believe global conflict and the bilateral or multilateral military 
involvement among Brazil and the United States appear to vary as a result of the economic 
interest of both countries.36 According to Crandall, Hirst, Mares and Trinkunas where 
opportunities toward joint military-security relations were missed between both countries, 
it was the economic interaction that proved to sustain as Brazil and the rest of Latin 
America would need U.S. investment in overcoming debt from previous decades.37 The 
 
34 Hirst, 56. 
35 Hal Brands, Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 11. 
36 Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 162; Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 58; Mares and Trinkunas, 
Aspirational Power, 90. 
37 Crandall, 162. 
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academics agree that post-Cold War priority by Brazil was internal development by 
minimizing debt and inflation accumulated in past decades.38 Additionally, the lack of 
external threat to the entire western hemisphere had isolated Brazil from drawing any 
hemispheric pressure to become anything more than economically and politically stable.39  
Crandall remarked that relations during the ’90s were predominately evolving 
around the United States economic interest among a swath of Latin American countries.40 
Interest, according to Crandall as well as Hirst, included the development and 
implementation of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative—a political ploy to enforce 
democratic consolidation within the region—as well as the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) which would bring on Latin American countries bilaterally one by 
one.41 Crandall continues on the institutional developments as being not without conflict 
in that internal domestic markets were still of priority to Brazil and that arguments over 
trade agreements had lessons relations that were to sufficiently take the place of previous 
Cold War relations which emphasized security cooperation.42 
Monica Hirst, on economic liberalization, noted that the United States had 
demanded that Brazil expand their markets which were against the domestic protectionism 
Brazil was trying to maintain. She continues to remark that the relational economic 
inconsistencies were a matter of the United States misperceiving the economic stability 
and nationalist priorities pursued by Brazil.43 The nationalistic economic interest was 
noted by both Crandall and Hirst as an impediment to coalition efforts in the Gulf War.44 
Indeed, as they both explain, the Gulf War was a prime example of the economic interest 
 
38 Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 162–71; Mares and Trinkunas, Aspirational Power, 89; Tullo 
Vigevani and Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira, “Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for 
Autonomy through Integration,” Latin American Perspectives 34, no. 5 (2007): 58–80, https://doi.org/
10.1177%2F0094582X07306164. 
39 Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 172. 
40 Crandall, 162–171. 
41 Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 36; Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 162–71. 
42 Crandall, 165.  
43 Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 170. 
44 Hirst, 17; Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 166. 
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of both countries resulting in a divergence. She further notes that at the start of the Gulf 
War, Iraq was one of Brazil’s largest arms exporters.45 The author also stresses that adding 
to the complexity is that while Brazil was still recovering from foreign debt and Iraq also 
owed Brazil money that could not be blocked. Ultimately, she posits the military power 
brought by the United States coalition proved to be enough, and Brazilian support was not 
needed. Given the quandary Brazil was in by selling arms to a country the United States 
went to war with did not help strengthen any greater ties militarily even despite the U.S. 
acknowledging that their only interest in Brazil was not to engage, as Crandall stresses.46 
Another argument that complements Hirst is from Roett Riordan in his book titled 
The New Brazil. Riordan delves deep into the economic interest of Brazil in which displays 
a divergence of relations.47 Riordan notes that national interest of the United States toward 
trade had been organized, according to Brazil, as unfavorable and directed Brazil to seek a 
more non-U.S. trade agreement elsewhere.48 Continuing over the significance of the 
United States interest in trade and the resulting divergence in relations, Riordan’s work 
implies an understanding that those interests are to be considered a sizable factor in 
eliminating other relations to develop—military-security relations.49 The interests for 
Brazil, noted by Riordan, are in the regional development and strengthening of trade that 
has trumped any interest in U.S.- developed free trade agreements.50 He continues, by 
acknowledging that strengthening regional ties has resulted in less security relations by 
efforts of Brazil to eliminate United States security influence within Latin America.51 
Riordan’s comments are unique by noting how Brazil is pushing to eliminate United States 
 
45 Crandall, 166. 
46 Crandall, 166. 
47 Riordan Roett, The New Brazil (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 127–48. 
48 Roett, 127–30. 
49 Roett, 141. 
50 Roett, 141. 
51 Roett, 143. 
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presence from regional trade which has an impact to lessening security relations that may 
benefit Brazil domestically.52  
Mares and Trinkunas take a different view from Riordan in that they emphasize the 
importance of Brazil’s development which gives them the ability or decision to be a soft 
power vice a hard power globally.53 They note that an increase in ability to express hard 
power will have positive consequences in soft power and that “both previous military 
governments and the contemporary democratic state in Brazil perceive that development 
of defense industries contributes to overall national development.”54 A lot of defense 
spending by Brazil is given to companies that already hold a foot in other areas of 
development. This is similar to how the United States uses the Department of Defense to 
advance commercial technology and manufacturing.  
3. Foreign Policy of the Executive Leadership 
Extended hands of welcoming dialogue between country leaders have been a 
common occurrence in the post-Cold War era. Many authors note the importance of 
leadership in paving the way toward better relations by highlighting personal relationships 
between leaders that have bridged the gap of official rhetoric.55 With regards to economic 
interest and global conflict an important topic that surfaces in much of the literature is 
around how leaders communicated their countries interest and demands as well as a 
genuine connection, or lack of, between leadership. Literature that emphasized Bush 
through Obama and Mello through Rousseff acknowledged a great deal of promising 
rhetoric that relations would develop as presidencies matured.56 The level of development 
that those relationships took was of much debate among authors. 
 
52 Roett, 127–33. 
53 Mares and Trinkunas, 90–93. 
54 Mares and Trinkunas, 90. 
55 Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 14; Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 162,174; Roett, The New 
Brazil, 91. 
56 Crandall, Hemispheric Giants, 162–90; Hirst, The United States and Brazil, 49–51. 
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Mares and Trinkunas gave great insight into the last two decades, starting from 
Cardoso and ending with Rousseff. Following the notion that each leader was met with 
constraints, Mares and Trinkunas advance that constraints both internal and external, 
ultimately led leaders to choose three options on how to improve Brazil.57 One choice was 
to focus only on internal development and forgo hard power. Another option they note was 
to use the international institutions to their benefit—trade agreements, security councils, 
etc.58 The last option, the two authors say, was the express overt dominance among global 
competitors to make initiatives to write the rules in their favor—exemplified by their 
insistence on earning a permanent position on the UN Security Council.59 
Crandall delves deeply into the United States position, or lack of, in foreign policy 
toward Brazil to be indicative of relationships being established. In contrast to Mares and 
Trinkunas, Crandall does not emphasize the constraints to leadership had in managing 
foreign policy and improving security relations. Beginning with President Mello (1990–
1992) the author makes it a point to note that outside of trade discussions, no other policy 
interaction was established by both parties. Of the trade talks—or disputes—an in-person 
visit between both leaders is what brought the most productivity in terms of tangible 
relations of both countries over trade. Militarily, Crandell notes that a good foundation for 
relations was created by Mello in his insistence on Brazil halting the use of their nuclear 
reactors.60 Another aspect of Crandell’s review of presidencies is the rhetoric that was 
commonly used by the incoming United States presidents. He reveals that commonly 
expressed words like those from Bush in 1990 in Brazil (“…I am here to tell you that you 
are not only on the right path, but the United States wants you to succeed and supports your 
efforts every step of the way…”) or those from Clinton in 1995 with Cardoso present (“In 
the months and years ahead, I look forward to working with President Cardoso to forge an 
 
57 Mares and Trinkunas, 59. 
58 Mares and Trinkunas, 59–83.  
59 Mares and Trinkunas, 59.  
60 Crandall, 163.  
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even stronger partnership between our nations and our peoples”) show patterns of 
presidents expressing behavior emphasizing cooperation and enhanced relations.61 
Roett’s remarks on leadership were made by emphasizing a significant challenge 
to relations between the United States and Brazil with Silva’s attempt at international 
mediation of nuclear proliferation between Iran and the United States. He first notes a rise 
in the trade as a result of Iran and Brazil’s leadership strengthening their ties, but then gives 
notice to how impactful a leader’s decisions could be by showing the discourse the United 
States had in return and essentially affecting any stronger ties between both countries.62 
Roett’s comments further support how policy initiatives made by leadership, while serving 
the national interest of their countries, can lead to a divergence in relations.  
The scholars’ views have shown a trend on the impact and importance leadership 
decisions on foreign policy have in creating stronger or weaken relations between the 
United States and Brazil. Additionally, decisions by the leadership of both countries to 
shape their foreign policy that shows their focus toward economic development has led to 
advances, at times, in security relations. Ultimately, scholars appear to emphasize that 
leaderships decisions to grow internally had created more outcomes and opportunities for 
the United States and Brazil to become closer as equals, vice, Brazil remaining a 
subordinate as a result of its domestic realities.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The indicators (independent variables) most suitable in affecting change in 
military-security relations (dependent variable) between both the United States and Brazil 
will be explored. The use of deductive reasoning by first making a few assumptions and 
developing hypothesis to data is paramount to this study. The period of exploration will be 
during the democratization of Brazil, beginning with presidents Bush and Mello and ending 
with presidents Obama and Rousseff. In preliminary research, the early indicators and 
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assumptions made evolve around fluctuations in economic development, global conflict, 
and foreign policy pursued by leadership.  
Using theory in international relations, the research will also be tested against a 
focused perspective in realism, specifically, the balance of power theory. This theory is 
displayed in the hypothesis on both indicators of global conflict and economic 
development. Theory rooted in realism is a display of the general findings in the field of 
international relations and how perceived threat and alliances created or the consequential 
balancing effect that result is unique to each country.63 A more liberal approach, using 
hegemonic stability theory that addresses conflict as a driver toward cooperation, will also 
be taken into consideration when looking into global conflict and the dominant interest 
between countries.64 More importantly, using the hegemonic stability theory may give a 
deeper understanding of why the United States national interest might be more influencing 
to relations between both countries than the interest of Brazil alone aspects of global 
conflict and economic development.  
Finally, given the amount of power and influence leaders have in foreign policy, it 
is important to emphasize the constructivist view over the influence leaders have to 
relations between both countries. Again, it is of the conventional wisdom that an 
importance be given to the limitations imposed on leadership of which the decisions made 
to overcome those limitations can result in difference outcomes.65 As such, leadership 
decisions and their impact will be taken into consideration for hypothesis three.  
(1) Hypothesis One  
Economic development of Brazil indicates a change in military security relations 
as displayed in joint operations, treaties, as well as the transfer of material power. This 
 
63 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
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65 Robert Jervis, “Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?,” Security Studies 22, no. 2 (2013): 
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hypothesis is heavily reliant on the literature that shows the implications of strengthening 
in military-security relations between both countries as a result of overall economic 
development of Brazil. Expressed by the scholars is the notion that Brazil will remain a 
subordinate power to the United States unless it can develop in which being recognized as 
a larger economy will bring about more attention as well as an impact in military-security 
relations.  
(2) Hypothesis Two  
Both countries’ executive leadership decisions of foreign policy have led to a 
change in military security relations. This hypothesis is developed as a result of the 
reviewed literature which has shown more or less the importance of personal initiatives 
toward foreign policy that might have a profound impact on military-security relations 
overall. The basis of policy creation and implementation will be the underlying direction 
challenging the hypothesis developed.  
(3) Hypothesis Three  
Both countries’ involvement in international and regional security institutions 
indicate a change in military security relations. Scholars reviewed have expressed the 
notion that post-Cold War involvement in these institutions appears to be limited in 
involvement by both countries, and also, that conflict involvement by both countries has 
come under heavy scrutiny or acceptance resulting in lasting impacts to mutual military-
security relations. Theory of IR has shown that because Brazil has been a subordinate 
power to the United States, they would either join other countries to balance the United 
States global influence, or join them to achieve greater prosperity as a nation.  
16 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
First, in order to discern the presence of military-security relations between the 
United States and Brazil, guidelines or criteria will be established.66 To the extent of how 
much involvement both the United States and Brazil engage within each area noted above 
will be taken into consideration among three areas of interest: economic development, 
global conflict, and leadership relations. Additionally, to deepen the understanding of 
military-security relations and security cooperation, Professor Derek Reveron of national 
security affairs at the War College has given remarkable insight in his book entitled 
Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing 
Face of the U.S. Military. Professor Reveron explains security cooperation within the 
United States as “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense 
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interest, 
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 
operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host 
nation.”67 
As noted in the historical recollection of military-security relations between the 
United States and Brazil that the beginning of military-security relations occurred when 
the United States sent U.S. naval officers to engage in professional military training. That 
gesture by the United States was not quantifiably analyzed, but the outcome, through 
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growing support, was that Brazil developed and modernized its military force, ultimately 
proving that in the absence of a military force in Brazil there would be no discussion on 
military-security relations. Looking through the lens of inductive reasoning, in that a 
military force in Brazil came as a result of United States engagement, evidence of relations 
using the criteria presented above in defining security cooperation are that it was military-
security relations that had occurred between both countries. The definitions provided, along 
with an explanatory elaboration on what are military-security relations, will be used when 
reviewing data going further.  
The literature suggests economic development in Brazil will bring military 
modernization and an increased ability to project soft and hard power.68 The research, 
between both countries from 1991 to 2016, will be on overall economic development and 
how it has or has not materialized into security cooperation between both countries. 
Various means of data on economic development will be sought out with heavy emphasis 
on GDP and military expenditures. In other words, will a change in prosperity of both 
countries affect military development and result in security cooperation? 
Using Derek Reveron’s theoretical framework, global conflict will be analyzed 
with the United States involvement as a benchmark.69 Additionally, to support the 
legitimacy of the conflict pursued by the United States and their multilateral military 
engagements, the conflict approval ratings in the United States will be noted. Brazil’s 
participation, in military security relations as described by Reveron or Dykeman, will also 
be noted. This analysis will allow the research to show if military-security relations 
between both countries are influenced by global conflict. 
Lastly, leadership relations will be measured by the cooperation that came as result 
of the foreign policy each leader pursued. The research will look for variations in foreign 
policy initiatives between both countries expressed by the leadership and if they metricized 
into an improvement in military relations and security cooperation. Research will delve 
 
68 Mares and Trinkunas, 90.  
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into each country’s perceptions of policy leaders have created as well as their senior staff 
members through primary sources. Additionally, a compare and contrast of different 
presidential terms and the foreign policy they projected and implemented will be reviewed. 
Noted definitions on security cooperation by Professor Reveron implicate official visits by 
senior leadership to be a display of relation and therefore official visits by senior military 
staff and their outcomes will also be reviewed as well.70 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I, as the intro, has provided the thesis and moving parts to include: 
historical background on military relations between the United States and Brazil as well as 
prerequisite definitions. Chapter II delves into how economic development of Brazil as 
well as corresponding military development has indicated change in military security 
relations with the United States. Chapter III examines how factors that influence executive 
decisions in foreign policy have indicated change in military security relations. Chapter IV 
reviews how Brazilian and United States interaction within international and regional 
security apparatus has indicated change in military security relations. Chapter V, the 
conclusion, provides results of the analysis to the chapters presented as well as 
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II. HOW DOES BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
INDICATE CHANGE IN MILITARY-SECURITY RELATIONS 
WITH THE UNITED STATES? 
The World Bank holds that Brazil’s population, since 1990, has grown fairly on 
pace with the United States and amassing a growth of over 50 million to 2018.71 
Additionally, GDP growth in Brazil from 1990 until 2018 has doubled while the United 
States has roughly tripled.72 Categorizing Brazil’s economic growth in relation to 
indicating a change in military cooperation with the United States, the use of the 
international relations framework of realism, as developed by theorists such as Kenneth 
Waltz and Hans Morgenthau, is employed.73 In contrast to the challenging established 
world order by China and Russia, it appears that Brazil is approaching a mere finesse tactic 
in achieving soft-power gains created by diversifying its economic growth and 
sustainment, toward one day obtaining competitive levels of hard power  and drawing 
interest from the United States. This chapter aims at taking ordinary observations of 
economic gains made by Brazil, such as GDP growth and economic policies, which have 
translated toward increased capacity for military development, modernization, and which 
ultimately has established a foundation to advance in military exercises with the United 
States.  
A. BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FROM 1980s DEBT CRISIS 
TO EMERGING WORLD LEADER BY THE 2000s 
Brazil’s economy has grown significantly over the past 25 years and the potential 
for bilateral relations, both economic and military, are growing in significance. While a 
focus on Brazil’s engagement in new economic institutions is discussed here, it is important 
to keep in mind the transformative powers of economic development, and specifically a 
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connection of that development extending itself into spheres of military relations. Tullo 
Vigevani and Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira capture the true nature of economic changes 
that had occurred in Brazil from the end of the Cold-War through the ‘90s and into the 
2000s.74 In this connection, they note that transitioning from “autonomy through distance” 
to “autonomy through integration” allowed Brazil to benefit more in global trade and 
development.75 “Autonomy through distance,” though not definitively defined by the 
authors, appears to encapsulate Brazil’s foreign policy of limited involvement in global 
institutions as its presidential office was directed by the military regime until the late 80s.76 
They explain that “autonomy through distance” was possible due to the insistence of the 
military regime through the 80s on maintaining government restrictions in privatized trade 
while taking on significant foreign debt from investment of the United States.77 Achieving 
“autonomy through integration” from 1990–2016 involved a wide array of policies 
undertaken by the Brazilian government, such as the privatization through liberalizing 
foreign investment, which shows that Brazil embraced globalization.78 Again, the authors 
do not definitively define autonomy through integration, but note how Brazil’s 
involvement in international institutions such as the WTO (1994) and Mercosur as well as 
other free trade agreements (FTAs) had been a dramatic change of policies from those 
under the military regime and proved to be for the betterment of their society as well as 
relations with the United States.79 Adopting neoliberal economic policies in the ‘90s, in 
similarity to the United States who made efforts in multilateral trade through free trade 
agreements, and greater involvement into global trade institutions, positioned Brazil to 
eventually capitalize on the commodities boom in the early 2000s. This commodities 
boom, brought on from Chinese economic growth, allowed Brazil to prosper as result of 
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its involvement in trade organizations such as the WTO and BRIC that facilitated greater 
trade.80  
1. How Brazilian Economic Growth and Soft Power Translates into 
Hard Power  
While economic development may produce a larger capacity for security 
cooperation both bilaterally with the United States and multilaterally with international 
institutions, a leading theme around Brazil’s initiatives to strengthen their economy is 
taking on more investment with surrounding countries as well as global hegemons. An 
inflection exists for how Brazil intended to seek economic development. First, by 
improving bilateral exchanges with the United States, additional security cooperation could 
manifest as a result of economic trade. Evidence here is shown simply by the stagnating 
Brazilian development of the ‘90s due to differences in free trade agreements and by 
increased bilateral agreements in the 2000s corresponding to the elevated arms transfers 
that steadily increased in the twenty year period between 1990 and 2001.81 Second, Brazil 
can continue to diversify its economic portfolio, perhaps resulting in a greater capacity for 
complex transfers and engagement in conducting security cooperation with the United 
States. Even as China has surpassed the United States in becoming Brazil’s leader in 
exports, SIPRI data holds that from 2010 to 2016 arms transfers to have still increased 
steadily.82 
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An increase in defense spending in Brazil since the military regime transitioned to 
a democracy in the 80s and recovery from the 1980s and early ‘90s debt crises have largely 
been a result of growing trust in civilian leadership as well as greater national wealth.83 
Noted by authors Mares and Trinkunas in a transcript of a speech from Defense Minister 
Amorim in 2013, that “Brazil’s National Defense Strategy, updated in 2012, states that the 
modernization of the Armed Forces is intrinsically linked to national development.”84 
Brazil’s emergence as global power is exemplified by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) real GDP long-term forecast which shows that by 
2060 Brazil’s GDP growth will double completely.85 Additionally, Trinkunas as Mares 
note that Brazil has comfortably been an economic leader among countries in its region 
while global aspirations have been limited by governing powers of global leaders.86 The 
authors continue by acknowledging that by gaining access and influence over global 
institutions, their movement within the global economy will become less restricted or 
regulated.87 When Brazil achieves goals of global influence, it appears necessary that 
given its size and geographic proximity to the United States, that growing military 
cooperation and engagement between both countries in efforts to share to burden or global 
security will evolve. 
Delving deeper and considering a more granular explanation of the alignment in 
U.S. national interest with Brazilian economic development that may result in 
strengthening military security relations is presented. Obtaining objectivity in 
understanding U.S. national interest while escaping misconceptions of the capacity of 
military deterrence, author James Miskel of the Naval War College notes that it is presumed 
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that U.S. national interest is derived from economic interest.88 Previous interaction 
included a prevalence of American investment into many Latin American countries 
including Brazil. The investment by the United States was predominately in agricultural-
based goods in which Brazil consequently became an export led economy as exemplified 
by their leading the world in soybean exports at 40 percent. Author Edmund Amann 
suggests that other areas of growth exist, in that “the names Embraer, Petrobás, and 
Odebrecht are fast becoming as globally recognized in their sectors as Boeing, Shell, and 
Bechtel.”89 Amenn continues over the importance on technology transfer as both an 
obstacle as well as the gateway toward further growth and relations between Brazilian 
multinational corporations and global hegemons.90 Therefore, Brazil’s limitations of 
economic flexibility appear to dampen efforts to improve technology and weapon’s 
modernization making them incomparable to other great powers. Even more so, while these 
obstacles are present in the Brazilian defense sector, any defense contracts and growing 
military relations with the United States appear to be equally limited as technology transfer 
restrictions remain in place by the United States.91 
2. Brazil Establishing Itself within the International Forum  
Luiz Pereira and Carlos Bressure noted that “In development economics, the failure 
of the ‘big push’ industrialization theories, which were behind the dominant import 
substitution model of industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, gave rise in the 1970s to an 
export-led, market-oriented theory of growth, whose basic tenets were privatization and 
trade liberalization.”92 While the 80s were overrun with debt as a result of state-run 
industry, heavy subsidization, and external investment, some scholarship has cast this 
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decade as the “lost decade” in economic growth as inflation soared and GDP declined.93 
This “lost decade” came as result of government strategies that included import substitution 
and outside barrowing as well as large investments in public spending.94 To counter these 
previous strategies, gaining access into organizations such as the WTO, the G20, as well 
as the newly formed association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) 
that has recognized Brazil “as one of the four very large, rapidly emerging economies that 
are key growth engines of the global economy” proved to be an advantage.95 Gaining 
access to these institutions appears to allow Brazil to grow not only its soft power through 
economic development, but also receive the prestige that surrounds the membership of 
these global institutions which might be necessary to achieve its long-time goal of 
becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.96  
The economic development achieved by Brazil, that has placed it in the same arena 
or size as other BRIC nations, should not include an aspiration for world dominance given 
the polar opposite political environment of which Brazil has grown their economy—a 
democracy. Noted by Pereira, on the fall of the authoritarian regime to have come as a 
result of economic calamity97 and the resulting push toward democratization shows a large 
difference in authoritarian regimes among other BRICS—China and Russia—who have 
held on to their government structures that have led them toward a Cold War with Russia 
and now the GPC with both countries. This democratization or the preservation of it during 
major financial crises of the late 80s and ‘90s may be the most important factor coupled 
with economic development that results in Brazil not being discussed as a threat in Great 
Power Competition (GPC) that the United States has embarked upon against China and 
Russia and affords Brazil an opening to strengthen ties with the United States as they gain 
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greater access to the international forum. There might also be the notion that Brazil’s 
involvement in the GPC debate is limited purely on the grounds of their combined 
incompatible soft and hard power that produces no concrete threat to global powers. While 
economic development in other BRICS nations has opened new markets for Brazil and 
fueled its growth, Brazil’s infatuation with restructuring the global economic institutions 
such as the WTO and UNSC has increased as well.98 Thankfully, values of democracy 
holding firmly in place within the Brazilian political society have not resulted in the use of 
its economic development or soft power as a leverage to gain access to global institutions.  
Given that Brazilian economic development through globalization has occurred, 
going further the intention is to provide how that development displays an indication of 
changing bilateral military security cooperation with the United States. While the United 
States has emphasized that the spread of democracy in Latin America has resulted in 
regional stability, it has become more appropriate to believe that the spread of security 
cooperation efforts has become equally stabilizing, and more importantly, has facilitated 
increased economic development throughout the region.99 A survey conducted in 2014, on 
the United States support for other countries, displayed a near unanimous agreement at 83 
percent.100 This survey, which was noted by Derek Reveron, acknowledges that “strong 
U.S. leadership in the world is desirable, so there is broad support for the indirect approach 
of assisting other countries.”101  
B. BRAZIL’S MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
Reveron has implicated an importance of data gathered by the state department, 
specifically the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, on how important it is that the money 
provided to our allies for military enhancement aligns with U.S. national interest. This data 
source, as noted by Reveron, displays key facts and figures in how we “manage capabilities 
of friends, allies, and coalition partners and to ensure that the transfer of US-origin defense 
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equipment and technology supports U.S. national security interest.”102 In other words, the 
United States has invested more into military security relations with Brazil as a result of 
growing U.S. interest throughout the region.  
Data provided in Figure 2 attempts to bring together Brazil’s economic growth in 
relation to the United States engagement in security cooperation since the 2000s (see 
Figure 1). As displayed, the Brazilian GDP growth in Figure 2 falls nicely in line with the 
cooperation accomplished by both the DOD and DoS, displayed in Figure 1. Unfortunately, 
despite significant economic growth in the early 2000s and limited U.S. interest in the 
region, Brazil’s military force and war industry have remained unable to achieve the level 
of technological modernization in through cooperation they desire.103  
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Figure 1. Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement between the 
United States and Brazil 2000–2016104 
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Figure 2. GDP per Capita of Brazil 1990–2017105 
Reveron also says the importance of coalition led military engagements, he says 
that “security cooperation is the way to develop other people’s armies.”106 In managing 
expectations for the outcomes of security cooperation with Brazil, historically, Brazilian 
military engagement with the United States was purely an effort to modernize and expand 
both military and economic capability.107 On that premise, along with the fact that Brazil 
political stability in democracy has weathered two major financial crises—’80s and ’90s 
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domestic debt crises and late 2000s in the United States—by doing so, it was allowed to 
decide when and how security cooperation would transpire.  
Finding a way to grow the Brazilian economy without the prevalence of U.S. 
investment appeared to be another point of contention that hindered greater security 
cooperation between both countries. Author Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira contends that 
the Cardoso administration was viewed by Brazilians to align with the United States 
interest on more economic matters than developing new levels of autonomy and 
divergence.108 He continues to note that officials in Washington knew that, in a very subtle 
way, the Brazilian government was shifting positions on that alignment toward initiatives 
to become a regional hegemon among Latin American countries and increasing 
partnerships with those of the south.109 Views on becoming a regional hegemon also 
aligned with Vigevani and Oliveira’s idea of “autonomy through integration,” except 
instead of integrating with the United States with other major economies, Brazil 
strengthened its alignment regionally through Mercosul. Mercosul developed as a response 
to Brazil being left out of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) established 
by Washington in the ’90s.110 This arrangement of the FTAA was widely viewed by 
Brazilians, as Bandeira quotes President Silva, saying it “isn’t really a free-trade pact. 
Rather, it’s a policy of annexation of Latin America by the United States.”111 
The autonomy in economic development sought by Brazil shows a relation to its 
view toward global economic institutions in that Brazil intends to have a diversified 
portfolio eliminating the prevalence of any one global hegemon from influencing them, 
especially United States. That economic development, created without a tie to the United 
States, is part of a larger plan to build soft power that shows potential for translating into 
hard power—military power. Noted from the World Bank is Brazil’s military expenditure 
as a percentage of their GDP from 1990 to 2016 (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Brazil’s Military Expenditure112  
In this graph it appears that overall spending is up, which would also show a relation 
to Figure 1, as with a growing economy it could be expected that more money would be 
allocated toward the military. Bandeira also notes that Brazil’s ability to strengthen ties 
with the other regional countries through Mercosul does increase its diversity in economic 
development as well as soft power needed to gain access to global institutions such as the 
UN Security Council.113 It appears that the access to institutions that Bandeira emphasizes 
bring about major decision of whether the United States intends to use this as an 
opportunity to welcome Brazil into international security cooperatives or obscure any 
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attempts,114 the former being in the best interest of both countries. A first step toward 
welcoming Brazil to the international security cooperative, and enhance its soft power and 
legitimacy, would entail assisting them in weapons modernization. Doing so may lead to a 
greater capacity in Brazil’s international security initiatives alongside the United States.  
C. BRAZIL’S CHANGING SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED 
STATES 
Given Brazil’s economic development and the data on increasing security 
cooperation shown previously, it is fairly evident that any economic development created 
would transpire into a larger interest by the United States to improve relations with Brazil. 
From information presented by the Wilson Center on Brazil-U.S. military relations dating 
from 1942, was that from 1978 to 2010 “U.S-Brazil defense cooperation remained in place 
without a framework agreement. During most years, both countries conducted terrestrial 
and naval exercises…”115 Naval exercises consisted of UNITAS, which is the longest 
standing exercises conducted by the United States in Latin American since 1959, which 
although has inconsistent data on participation among countries appears to hold Brazil as 
a continual participant through many reports submitted by the United States Navy.116 The 
Wilson Center notes that in 2010 both countries signed an agreement that was “a broad 
treaty defining the rules for cooperation, and General Security of Military Information 
Agreement (GSOMIA)” which ultimately led to the United States accepting placement of 
a Senior Brazilian Military within the Army South command structure.117 Unfortunately, 
this agreement was not viewed by Brazilian policymakers as a substantial gesture of 
strengthening military relations but just another way the United States is establishing 
hegemony.  
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Fast-forward to the early 2000s, it appears that seeing emphasis toward 
modernization in the 70s by Brazil has largely remained. As the country has grown in size 
economically it is likely that participation in these bilateral exercises will only bring about 
more and more advances in tactics and weaponry. A Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations House of 
Representatives, one hundred sixth congress, conducted in June of 2000, gave insight into 
how advanced capabilities are shared in which “Raytheon’s SIVAM Amazon Monitoring 
System Project, which will help Brazil improve its control over its territory, including air 
space, to better combat narcotrafficking in the Amazon region.”118 Again, on UNITAS, 
improvements on exercise planning and execution have largely included the efforts and 
knowledge of the United States in developing realistic targeting.  
D. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF UNITAS 
A widely accepted gesture of strengthening relations, established since 1959, is the 
UNITAS exercise, which has a longstanding history of building the relations between the 
United States and South America. UNITAS allows countries the opportunity to take the 
lead on planning, organizing, and executing various strategic, operational, and tactical 
events by facilitating military training environments welcoming all participants. This 
facilitation includes convention space and planning rooms, access to ports and detailed 
maritime information including shipping traffic and zones available for naval exercises. 
This event allows the United States and Latin American senior military level planners an 
opportunity to gain a full-picture overview of the event from start to finish. Operational 
and tactical leaders also meet within the country that facilitates the exercises, including 
battle group commanders down to unit level commanders. So mutual engagement in this 
exercise, specifically between the United States and Brazil, serves as another way of 
exemplifying changes in military relations.  
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Over the last decade, Brazil has led the way in maintaining a close connection with 
U.S. military leaders as they insisted that the bilateral exercise evolve over time. 
Emphasizing the need to push the evolution of the exercise, as noted in a commemorative 
booklet released by U.S. Southern Command in 2009, “the Brazilian Navy proposed 
redirecting UNITAS operations to encompass a broader range of modern naval warfare 
missions and to incorporate greater realism into the exercise.”119 This proposal by Brazil 
appears to have a much larger implication than meets the eye as an early signal showing 
an importance to developing and obtaining a highly modernized and effective military. 
This proposal also shows an effort by Brazil to gain legitimacy and relevance as another 
way of achieving new defense agreements and getting closer to permanent membership on 
the UNSC. Additionally, the publication notes that other Latin American countries were 
excitingly responsive to the proposal and full endorsement was reciprocated by even the 
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.120 This evolution included the involvement of nuclear 
attack submarines as well as destroyer squadron commanders and an early workup co-opt 
that included officers from participating countries to plan the exercises and ultimately 
increasing a knowledge base throughout Latin America.121  
Southern Command publication on latest efforts of UNITAS mentions that the 
United States has developed and delivered drone vessels to the exercises which have 
significantly improved partner nation’s ability to deter small boat threats that would 
otherwise have left their navy vulnerable to non-state actors. Born primarily from terrorist 
threats that had affected the USS Cole bombing as well as others, additional innovations 
include the SDST which was delivered in UNITAS 2002. SDST “consisted of a remote-
controlled personal watercraft, operated through a data link system.”122 Growing 
involvement in technology and modernization by the United States was transferred into an 
expansion of UNITAS into three geographic categories which include the Pacific, Atlantic, 
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and the Caribbean as well as developing amphibious focused exercises.123 After the 
expansion, Brazil appears to take the leading role in the Atlantic phase as they have hosted 
numerous events.124 Overall, growing participation by Brazil through general numbers of 
ships and personnel as well as modernized warfare capacity used during UNITAS by Brazil 
appears to develop alongside their economy. Brazil’s economic development affects its 
ability to maintain, train, and equip their forces, therefore affecting its ability to participate 
in UNITAS.  
Aiding the argument in economic development indicating more or less 
opportunities in security cooperation between both countries is from the Subcommittee 
hearing discussed previously. Mentioned by the committee was that “Brazil’s increasing 
economic and political integration into global and hemispheric affairs has created common 
U.S. and Brazilian interest on a range of regional and multilateral issues and led to a new 
era of bilateral cooperation.”125 Noted later in the excerpt by Linda H. Eddlemen, is the 
close mirroring of economic ties to security ties between both countries.126 This link 
signifies the importance of not only a growing Brazilian economy, but also that the United 
States maintains a close partnership at every step of the way which can ensure that interest, 
specifically those of security, remain tightly bound. This partnership also allows for greater 
projection to other great power competitors, such as China and Russia, that the United 
States and Brazil are aligned.  
E. CONCLUSION  
It appears in reviewing the Brazilian economic profile as well as its historical 
changes made by its government to liberalize and globalize, a growing capacity for military 
security engagement has occurred. While other factors may contribute to displaying 
indications of change in military relations, factors such as such preferred foreign policy 
decisions by presidents, or even the changing security environment both regionally as well 
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as globally, Brazil’s capacity to participate and improve military relations appears to 
revolve around their economic development. Additionally, engaging in international 
economic institutions such as the WTO and Mercosul also appears reinforce the demand 
for establishing greater security collaboration and efforts while Brazil’s leading role in 
international exercises such as UNITAS show implications of that they are willing to 
mutually engage in greater complex military involvement with the United States.  
  
36 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
37 
III. LEADERSHIP AS AN INDICATOR OF CHANGE IN 
MILITARY-SECURITY RELATIONS 
As Brazil is looking to continue its growth economically, by joining international 
organizations such as the WTO and BRICS, a pivot in this chapter is directed toward 
observations of the executive power and foreign policy decisions by both countries leaders. 
As noted in Chapter II Brazilian economic growth indicated new opportunities for 
advancing security relation through its economic development, additionally presidential 
options to influence foreign policy had also changed. Brazilian presidents prior to the 1990s 
had only been concerned with their domestic economic agenda but as a result of 
globalization through commerce increasing their soft power, presidents were afforded the 
opportunity to look beyond their territory and truly express new initiatives in foreign policy 
with other countries, specifically the United States. The diplomatic interaction that 
occurred had risen significantly from what had taken place during Brazil’s military regime 
as well as the first decade of democratization. Another significant change in decisions of 
foreign policy made by Brazil was from the military regime (1964–1985) and first half 
decade of democratizing (1985–1990) with the control of foreign policy by the bureaucratic 
administration being handed over to the presidents.127 Foreign policy concerns for U.S. 
presidents during the Cold War largely encompassed the use of containment of the USSR 
and preventing the spread of communism. Post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy interest was 
similar to that of the post military regime led Brazil, in that foreign policy interest had 
significantly expanded. This expansion had perhaps rejuvenated new dialogue with Latin 
American countries, specifically Brazil.  
Similar to the time periods that were covered in the discussion of economic 
development, presidential terms of both sides will be reviewed between 1990–2016. The 
first pairing will be between President Georgia H. W. Bush (1989–1993) and Fernando 
Collor de Mello (1990–1992) as well as Itamar Franco (1992–1995), followed by Bill 
Clinton (1993–2001) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003) finishing the ’90s. The 
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early 2000s will review decisions made by George W. Bush Jr. (2001–2009) and Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) while continuing on with Barack Obama (2009–2016) 
and both Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016). Additionally, 
surrounding the coverage from president to president is the notion that the United States 
security interests have largely been directed in regions for fairly specific reasons as 
exemplified by the GWOT and the United States interests in South and Central Asia as 
well as the Middle East in support of operation Iraq Freedom that has gone on since 
2001.128 Understanding the U.S. security interest in Latin America in the 21st century, 
author Emil Coletta wrote in the Security Assistance Monitor that United States distribution 
of security assistance within the Western Hemisphere since early 2000s is primarily 
focused on “transnational security interest.”129  
A. PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY  
Presidents only have so much power to achieve aspirations of economic 
development as well as military growth and modernization. Largely based on the economic 
development and stability, especially by Brazil, are presidents afforded the luxury of 
engaging more or less on the international forum. Viewing domestic political gain as a 
basis for improving security cooperation, as Coletta notes, over the last 20 years Latin 
America as a whole has not seen a significant fluctuation in their importance to U.S. 
security interest which leaves room to speculate over the ability of American presidents to 
revive relations from term to term.130 While there appears to be a consistency of limited 
interest in security cooperation in Latin America as a whole, decisions made or 
relationships gained by leaders of both countries appear to have far-reaching impacts on 
military security relations. 
Derek Reveron opens his book regarding changes in foreign policy of the United 
States by noting that the change in foreign policy came as a result of instability created by 
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global hegemons as well as domestic disputes within the developing world.131 He 
continues by acknowledging a drastic change to combat that volatility by saying “In an 
effort to reach for peace, the United States responds to foreign policy crises like these not 
by sending combat forces to confront aggression, but instead by sending weapons, trainers, 
and advisors to help other countries tackle their security deficits.”132 Understanding this 
change in foreign policy with regards to military to military engagement and cooperation 
it may be significant to note that presidents in the ’90s and those in the 2000s were given 
a different set of circumstances in security concerns that resulted in a change of application 
in military relations.  
A large emphasis by Reveron is on the changing structure of foreign assistance 
from purely aid given predominantly by the Department of State and various NGOs that 
are met with limitations and consequent gaps that are now being filled by the military.133 
A search in this chapter is to uncover a truth, based on the preponderance of qualitative 
evidence, that presidents and policymakers can lay the foundation for impactful change in 
military security relations by extending amicable overtones, collaborative and engaging 
behavior, and ultimately filling positions within their cabinets that display an effort to 
engage with Brazilian leadership. An attempt at observing how presidents and 
policymakers visibly produce an indication of change in military relations as a result of a 
greater understanding in the significance of using an adaptive and effective military force 
within their foreign policy is the primary focus. As noted previously by Reveron, military 
security cooperation and support can occur in many different ways such as providing 
forces, equipment, or training. The next sections will look at how leaders are influenced to 
make decisions on foreign policy, which may indicate changes to military relations. 
1. Leadership and Legacy of Foreign Policy  
Presidents come into office with pressure from the international forum, domestic 
foreign circumstances, or personal leadership goals. As noted by Kehoe Genevieve in 
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Presidents and Terminal Logic Behavior: Term Limits and Executive Action in the United 
States, Brazil, and Argentina one key difference in the focus of foreign policy between 
United States presidents and Brazilian presidents, and as also discussed in the previous 
chapter, that as a result of their economic differences and levels of development versus 
developing, Brazilian presidents are more concerned with domestic security while growing 
their economy and conversely the United States presidents are pressured to uphold the 
status quo of American superiority and global dominance.134 Kehoe continues on their 
differences as a matter of how each president desires to be seen in history and where they 
can contribute more as a result of making change domestically versus globally. In her 
words she notes,  
I expect these countries to diverge in the policy area in which their 
presidents seek to fulfill their legacy agenda. For instance, I hypothesize 
that presidents in the United States seek to fulfill their legacy agenda in 
foreign affairs. In contrast, I  expect the legacy agenda of presidents of 
Argentina and Brazil to be more directly related to issues in the country and 
less so to issues surrounding the country’s interests in world politics.135 
She also notes that the United States presidents are afforded the opportunity to look 
abroad as a result of a its great economic development.136 Adding to Kehoe’s remarks is 
her hypothesis that presidents of both countries deliver more declarations at the end of their 
term as opposed to the beginning as a result of the pressure exerted by the allotted time 
given in each term length.137 Kehoe offers no relation toward an indication of presidents 
announcing or formulating new plans of a change in military relations within their 
respective foreign policies, but implications were levied toward U.S. presidents being more 
inclined to direct more promises in foreign policy and Brazil remaining focused on their 
domestic priorities.138 This information enables more focus toward the overtones, 
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collaborative and engaging behavior through physical interaction, and Brazil or even Latin 
American focused positions established within U.S. Presidencies. In other words, it may 
have been preconceived views toward presidential action in foreign policy may have 
dictated the decisions made by presidents.  
2. Autonomy in Leadership to Influence Foreign Policy  
Generally, as is the case for Brazil, presidents that come to office with surmounting 
domestic stability, are potentially afforded opportunities to devise ways in which they can 
transform their soft power development into hard power. Despite the presence of 
indifference in Brazil toward developing a hard power without gaining soft power, as noted 
by Mares and Trinkunas in previous work, Brazil’s goal of being a regional hegemon still 
relies on their development in hard power, such as the noted development of the Amazon 
surveillance equipment as well as their interest in developing a blue water fleet to secure 
offshore oil recently discovered.139 Harold Trinkunas and David Pion-Berlin in their work 
titled Attention Deficits: Why Politicians and Scholars Ignore Defense Policy in Latin 
America noted that challenges in establishing a defense policy in Latin America remained 
in the lacking international threats, longstanding military ruling that could re-emerge given 
greater capability, and the general consensus over the irrelevance in the politicization of 
military strength which is apathetically constant among a majority of Latin American 
countries.140 Also, to ensure their hard power is developed without the suspicion of 
nefarious intentions allows each country’s leaders to display relations making them more 
and more significant.  
Another significant indicator of how each country’s leadership plays a role in 
security cooperation is how much power or influence the top leadership, specifically the 
presidents, have in foreign policy decisions. This question is especially important when 
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considering how Brazil has evolved economically as well as politically. Jeffrey Cason and 
Timothy Power, in their work titled Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of 
Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula 
Era discuss how the power and influence of presidents over foreign policy has changed 
since the ‘90s. They contend that as a result of economic policy changes moving away 
from import substitution, which brought a major debt crisis, and toward liberalization 
politics also followed this role in allowing presidents to achieve greater interaction with 
the leaders of other nations.141 They noted that the government control of their foreign 
policy, in a similarity to their domestic economy, was not only controlled by the Itamaraty 
but also became highly bureaucratized. This bureaucratic control by the Itamaraty appears 
to have resulted in little to no major strategic efforts in developing foreign policy. 
3. Leadership Characteristics 
Finally, the last contributing theorist whose work includes the levels of analysis 
theory and that specifically focuses on how individuals can effect international relations is 
author Robert Jervis, whose work titled Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know? 
acknowledges key indications in characteristics of leaders that may present a level of 
openness toward reciprocating acts of foreign policy and even if doing so does not result 
in the betterment of a leader’s position.142 One element of a leader’s persona, emphasized 
by Jervis, is that of trust. On the importance of trust, Jervis contends that  
Trust, assuming it is a stable characteristic that acts across domains, can 
have a more straightforward impact on policies. Presidents who are more 
trusting will be willing to enter into more and riskier agreements than will 
those who are low on this dimension. They will place a higher likelihood on 
others cooperating and will accept arrangements in which reciprocity is 
delayed and inexact, in part out of the belief that the other will see the long 
run advantages of a sustained relationship.143 
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In this excerpt, Jervis remarks a resemblance in connection between liberalism and 
trust and that decisions in foreign policy were merely a response to the changing 
international order after World War II.144 Taking Jervis’s views of trust and liberalism as 
a consequence to the changed world order post World War II, to the period of post-Cold-
War reviewed here, and how a bipolar international order morphed into the unipolar as 
American interest expanded, may have aided in allowing leaders of both countries to 
gravitate toward each other.  
As the proceeding sections show, leadership’s influence in military relations 
appears to be determined by legacies, autonomy in influence of foreign policy, and personal 
leadership characteristics. Using those three factors as a framework for each president 
within the period noted may provide further clarity to the dynamics of indicators to change 
in military relations. Provided below is a snapshot of each presidency, and notable events, 
agreements, and actions they have taken in foreign policy that may have indicated a change 
in military security relations through the time period noted.  
B. PRESIDENT COMPARISON  
1. President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) 
Beginning with Presidents George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) and Fernando Collor 
de Mello (1990–1992) and Itamar Franco (1992–1995), their expressions made of 
extending relations in the public sphere as well as key members in their cabinet are noted 
followed by notable changes in foreign policy engagement to that of military cooperation. 
Bush’s 1990 visit to Brazil presented rhetoric that would implicate deepening relations 
between the two countries. During this visit Bush is recorded as saying “Brazil today is 
poised to enter the 21st century as a leader among nations. . . . I am here to tell you that 
you are not only on the right path, but the United States wants you to succeed and supports 
your efforts every step of the way.”145 This rhetoric, while comforting, appeared to be only 
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background noise in what lay ahead as Collor’s first year in office delivered a significant 
shock to Brazil’s domestic economy.  
The Bush administration’s embarking on an initiative to liberate Kuwait from an 
Iraqi invasion, while insisting that Brazil discontinued arms transfers to their largest 
buyer—Iraq—as noted by Monica Hirst (see Chapter I), appeared to hinder early 
opportunities in military security relations. Additionally, Collor, who some advance that 
ceasing arms transfers to the Saddam regime was only a result of not receiving payment, 
also began strategizing a way for Brazil to lessen its economic disarray. The legacy of 
Bush, while heavily surrounding his actions in the Middle East, appears to be bound by the 
United States magnifying its reach on global security as a result of ending the Cold War.  
a. Collor de Mello (1990–1992) 
Remarks on Collor’s short time in office by Juliana de Brum Fernandes’s excerpt 
in the Encyclopedia of Political Communications referenced his tough economic policy 
decisions that were labeled appropriately as the Collor Plan in which “was to stop 
government spending, prevent inflation, and modernize the economy.”146 She continues 
that reducing inflation was a success but consequently he “triggered an economic recession, 
a collapse in industrial production, the closure of industries, and an increase in 
unemployment.”147 His next plan, labeled Collor Plan II initiated to reverse the cascading 
recession also proved inadequate and ultimately brought on corruption charges and 
corresponding impeachment as “the Senate declared him guilty of corruption.”148 
Collor’s ability to further relations with Bush also appears to be clouded by both 
President Bush’s actions in the Middle East and his own domestic economic turmoil. Collor 
might have been handcuffed by those in Washington who insisted that his country remain 
out of the conflict and discontinue arm sales to Iraq. U.S. soldiers identified Brazilian 
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weapons in the hands of Iraq soldiers, which may have also left a dark cloud over increasing 
relations with the Bush administration.149 Additionally, Collor’s administration was using 
arms sales to grow the economy, and after the United States directed a foreign policy of 
containment as a means to strangle the Saddam regime, Brazil’s future potential in arms 
sales to the middle east also dried up while limiting military relations with the United States 
at the time. It is also conceivable that corruption charges levied against Collor tarnished 
not only any prospective legacy toward Brazil’s economic advancement but slighted the 
views of those in Washington to improve any relations.  
b. Itamar Franco (1992–1995) 
Franco, taken from being Collor’s vice president to being sworn in to presidency in 
August of 1992, waited only until December to impose a new economic policy that was 
directed toward further reducing inflation but limited Brazil’s efforts toward increasing 
globalization through opening its markets. While notable relations with Bush Sr appear to 
be limited given their term periods, a convergence in relations with Clinton administration 
had been achieved. As for Franco moving closer to strengthening ties with Washington 
during the Clinton administration, from a declassified document given from President 
Clinton to Franco in 1994, you see actions by the Franco presidency in nonnuclear 
proliferation within Brazil drawing both direct appreciation and implications for closer 
relations with the United States (see Figure 4). As Clinton writes in page 2 of 2, paragraph 
two (“As I mentioned…”), which shows the impact of Franco’s decision to align Brazilian 
security interest with the United States and perhaps creating an increasing trajectory in 
future relations. Additionally, reviewing SIPRI arms transfers during the Franco 
presidency, 1992 was noted at 7 million, which is in line with the letter from Clinton, which 
had gone to 34 million in only two years by 1994.150 Also, the letter appears to signify a 
significant decision made by Franco, especially given his short time in office, that perhaps 
provided a great hand-off in relations to the next president, Cardoso.  
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Page 1 of 2 
Figure 4. Official Letter from President Clinton to Franco Provided by U.S. 
Department of State151 
 
151 Source: William J. Clinton, “Congratulatory Presidential Letter on Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Ratification,” Confidential, Cable (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 26, 1994), Digital 
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Page 2 of 2 
Figure 4. (Con’t) Official Letter from President Clinton to Franco 
Provided by U.S. Department of State152 
 
152 Source: Clinton. 
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c. Bush/Collor/Franco 
Using arms transfers as a way to measure change in military relations, during the 
years that Bush and Collor as well as Franco were in office, appears to have first declined 
before gaining new heights. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
database shows that arms transfers from United States to Brazil from 1990–1993 were in 
decline from 37 million in 1990 to 0 in 1993.153 Shortly after and on through Franco and 
Cardoso’s terms had arms transfers risen dramatically.154 Authors Sean Burges, Bastos 
Chagas, and Fabricio H. note that scholars believed lasting impressions of the foreign 
policy imposed by the Collor presidency evolved around three areas of focus. Those areas, 
noted by the authors, were “…(i) adapting Brazil to the ‘new world order’; (ii) rebuilding 
the relationship with the USA; and (iii) an effort to de-characterize Brazil as a Third World 
country.”155 They also acknowledged that Franco essentially maintained the status quo of 
foreign policy established by Collor as he was being overcome by Brazil’s civil society 
being reconstructed and aligned with the new liberalized economic structure.156 
2. President William J. Clinton (1994–2000) 
President Clinton has always been revered as holding deep intellect with the ability 
to make logical and effective political decisions. The intellect and comprehension for 
making important policy decisions was also noted by author Michael Takiff in his 
biography titled A Complicated Man: The Life of Bill Clinton as Told by Those Who Know 
Him. Takiff writes that “he had been a successful and long-serving governor or Arkansas. 
His upbringing had left him with the ability to understand and identify with the problems 
of ordinary people.”157 Clinton’s primary focus in his run against President Bush and 
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following the inauguration, was the establishment of universal healthcare, which given 
Brazil’s lacking civil society and welfare might have combined parallel interests that 
brought them closer together.  
a. Cardoso (1995–2002) 
During the Clinton administration, Cardoso moved closer to strengthening ties with 
Washington. For Cardoso, noted by authors Chagas, Burges, and Fabricio, an impactful 
and influential personal background had prepared him well for allowing his approach to 
foreign policy to encompass the engagement of world leaders.158 They remarked how 
“Prior to starting a political career in the early 1980s, the fluently quadrilingual Cardoso 
had already established himself as a leading international intellectual in the fields of 
development, authoritarianism and democratization, building a deep network of political 
and scholarly friendships across Latin American, the USA and Western Europe.”159 This 
background also included roles within the Itamar Franco office which reinforced his belief 
over the necessity of Brazil to align themselves both with the United States and also the 
international world order. The authors also note how his beliefs of aligning Brazil to the 
international order and his emphasis on globalization had brought him directly to the 
signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT; signed in 1997), a decision that was 
highly contested by others in Brazil yet made possible by his beliefs alone.160 
Data from SIPRI shows that after Clinton took office, arms transfers increased from 
37 million in 1994 to as high as 131 million in 1997 and finishing at 111 million by 
2001.161 Additionally, information shared by Cason and Powers displayed a significant 
uptick in presidential meetings between these world leaders.162 Military spending in Brazil 
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based on GDP, of data collected by SIPRI, shows the majority of the ‘90s remaining 
constant, around 2 percent.163  
An intellectual like Clinton, Cardoso’s biographical information includes a great 
deal of academic achievements, to include holding a prominent role in the development of 
the economic policy that would take over Latin America—dependency theory—as well as 
holding many leading collegiate and doctoral positions in sociology in Brazil as well as the 
United States and Europe.164 It appears that because of these achievements in academia he 
developed a sense of understanding of the purpose and importance of relationships and 
how those relationships can develop into new tangible benefits toward Brazilian growth. 
While Cardoso emphasized reaching out to the international community in ways to attract 
new investment as well as seeking views from other world leaders on the legitimacy of 
Brazilian growth, President Clinton appears to have taken a liking to Cardoso’s direction. 
Speaking in Brazil in October 1997, Clinton asserted how important it was that  
the people of Brazil understand that just as with the trade issue and 
Mercosur, the  United States would never knowingly make any suggestion 
that would undermine the growth of Brazil or any other country. It is not in 
our interest. . . . The vocation of Brazil and the United States is to stand 
together. I believe we stand together  today as never before.165 
Now trade between Brazil and the United States may not have gone as well as 
Cardoso may have insisted as Brazil appeared to not desire the terms of a proposed Free 
Trade Agreement of the America’s (FTAA) drafted by the United States as well as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and looked elsewhere. Elsewhere, 
brought Brazil toward joining the World Trade Organization and increasing its role in 
Mercosul, but despite the misalignment in economic trade agreements at the time, security 
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interest still aligned as Cardoso signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 1997 that appears 
to also converge the relations as noted by Clinton in his address. 
Cardoso’s foreign policy decisions appear to have resonated with Jervis’s approach 
to explaining how leaders are influenced in both their personal characteristics and 
leadership decisions. Cardoso, while advancing his personal agenda by signing the NPT 
and making efforts to align security interest with the United States, gained substantial 
success in devising economic policies that appeared to have aided in giving him the 
autonomy required to find new ways to align Brazil with the United States. Additionally, 
given the new opportunity to leave the country and build upon Brazil’s foreign policy 
relations with other leaders such as Clinton, his personal characteristic of being a quasi-
intellectual appeared to have gained notable interest and perhaps helped the increasing 
military security relations through arms transfers from 1995 to 2000.  
3. GEORGE W. BUSH (2001–2008) 
“The conservative former oilman and the trade unionist indeed formed an odd 
couple. But they got on well. The chemistry between the two presidents was immediate, 
according to Rubens Barbosa, who as Brazil’s ambassador to Washington was present.”166 
At the beginning of Bush’s presidency, in a meeting with Cardoso, an understanding of 
obstacles to overcome were discussed. Those obstacles lay mostly in Brazil’s exclusion 
from the FTAA established during the Clinton administration.167 Rhetoric shared between 
both of them appears to have emphasized a foundational approach that Bush would then 
establish throughout his presidency to converge interests of both countries. That rhetoric, 
stated by both presidents as Bush said “The President [Cardoso] and I have made a decision 
that we’ll work closely to iron out any differences that may exist.”168 Cardoso followed 
up by responding that “That’s true. I do agree with the President. I believe that—we have, 
of course, from time to time some difference. That’s normal between nations. Yesterday 
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the Presidents said, American—to be American first. Well, I would say the same, to be 
Brazil first. That’s normal. But then let’s see how to cooperate.”169  
Talks between Bush and Lula de Silva in 2007, at Camp David, resulted in 
increased efforts by both sides to improve collaboration on international peace and 
security.170 The talks cemented both country’s inclusion toward aiding both Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic as well as others. Involvement by both countries was done under the 
authority of the United Nations, which both countries involvement along with others to 
create the official UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This involvement, 
especially for Brazil, ultimately improved the tactics and techniques that gave them the 
ability to not only work together in future peace keeping operations, but individually 
become more proficient across the spectrum of military operations.171  
While critics of the MINSTAH mission have reported the use of excessive force by 
Brazil against the Haitian government opposition, it appears the goal had been 
accomplished by 2010, which marked a very important joint effort taken by two of the 
hemisphere’s largest military forces.172 Noted by Antonio Barbosa at the 2009 G20 Sao 
Paulo meeting, it appears that Presidents Lula and Bush were at odds over their approach 
to the 2008 post-financial crisis. The United States was content with emphasizing 
nationalization while Brazil insisted on increased globalization. While economic 
collaboration was not achieved, a critical military cooperation agreement was, the first of 
which that had been signed since 1975.173  
Another key figure in establishing and maintaining relations between both countries 
during the Bush administration was Thomas Shannon. Shannon led efforts in Latin 
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America and was known as having an exceptionally high-leveled interest in working with 
Brazil that resulted in the development of important relationships that otherwise had been 
left in frustration and miscommunication during previous presidencies.174 Those important 
relationships appeared to have extended into security cooperation as the Security 
Assistance Monitor shows that aid provided from 2000 to 2010 was given on a more 
consistent manner than from 2010–2016.175 
Unfortunately, arms transfers from United States to Brazil, according to SIPRI, 
went from 111 million in 2001 to zero by 2009.176 Additionally, SIPRI shows that 
Brazilian military spending based on GDP in the 2000s was reduced by half a percent from 
the ‘90s.177 This limited military relation might have come as a result of the United States 
engaging in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks in which Brazil’s 
policy, while supportive, resulted in minor actual support.  
For Bush, all three factors noted above—legacy, autonomy to influence foreign 
policy, and personality—do not appear to fit the mold. As noted most previously, the 
effects of 9/11 appear to overcome the majority of foreign policy decisions the Bush 
administration proposed and any decisions on foreign policy appeared to have been 
overwhelmingly in favor of the war on terrorism. Therefore, it almost appears that Bush 
was left with the lack of autonomy in foreign policy decisions that had to do with anything 
other than dealing with the war on terror. As a result, any rhetoric shared between nations 
was simply lip service with no tangential backing.  
a. Lula da Silva (2003–2010) 
On decisions made by both Cardoso and Lula da Silva, noted earlier by Power and 
Cason, was how President Cardoso as well as Lula not only understood the changing 
economic and political dynamics of the ‘90s but emphasized the importance of face to face 
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meetings with world leaders as the priority for advancing Brazil’s domestic well-being.178 
Cason and Power also remarked that critics of Lula over his excessive travel coined his 
plane as “AeroLula” because of how much he flew out of the country.179 Other interesting 
remarks on how each president approached foreign policy rested in their respective 
backgrounds. Cardoso’s interest with developed countries came as result of his formal 
education and intellectual background while Lula’s interest in developing countries and 
future investment came as a result of a business background.180 
The most startling example of a changing structure in presidential influence over 
foreign policy was simply in how much travel—noted as a significant event given that 
official power transfer is achieved when presidents travel abroad—both Cardoso and Lula 
took in comparison to leaders before them.181 Information presented by Cason and Power 
acknowledge that previous President Ernesto Geisel—who led the military regime—left 
the country only ten times, then followed by Sarney and Collor, who only left “7 to 8 times 
annually.”182 For Presidents Cardoso and Lula, traveling occurred ten times the amount of 
prior presidents as Cason and Power mention that “Cardoso left Brazil 92 times in his eight 
years” while Lula surpassed him, leaving the country “60 times in only four years.”183 
Included in their work is a figure (Figure 5) showing all the absences taken by Brazilian 
presidents which again may indicate new opportunities toward advancing interest in 
security cooperation.  
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Figure 5. Absences Taken by Brazilian Presidents184  
Author Steen Fyba Christensen noted Brazil’s foreign policy in reaction to how 
Lula regarded American foreign policy which was interpreted as being overly intrusive and 
noncompatible with Brazil’s growing interest to establish a new world order that 
accommodated Brazil as a partner rather than as another South American country being 
supported by the Western hegemon.185 President Lula, along with his Secretary General 
of Foreign Affairs Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, believed that Brazil could be the leader 
among a more unified and strengthened South America.186 For Guimarães specifically, he 
came to believe in only two options: “to either create a united South America that would 
serve its peoples or to face political subordination to U.S. hegemony and the social chaos 
and economic backwardness that would ensue.”187  
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Another outcome of Lula’s foreign policy directly relating to regional peace 
keeping operations in Haiti, explained by Christensen, was how the United States 
welcomed Brazil’s leadership in stabilizing Haiti which ultimately fell in line with 
Brazilian policy to prove that they were a regional leader in security.188 Despite a 
welcoming attitude by the United States in Brazil’s efforts in Haiti, a growing economy 
coupled with newly defined Defense Strategy in 2008 appeared to juxtapose previous 
attempts at recognizing a partner in Brazil and creating new means of ensuring that 
dominance regionally remained with the United States. Exemplifying the struggle to 
remain a dominant force was how the United States reactivated the Fourth Fleet Command 
which, as noted by Christensen, “was seen by many in Brazil as a response by the USA to 
Brazil’s proposal.”189  
While Bush and Lula’s presidencies overlapped, domestic and international 
concerns appeared to have been of most importance. For Bush it was the attacks of 9/11 
that moved any chances to strengthen foreign policy with Brazil toward focusing on the 
Global War on Terror. For Lula, a booming Chinese economy became a focal point for 
Brazilian growth. While Lulu saw options to diversify Brazil’s economy as exemplified by 
China becoming Brazil’s top economic exporter by 2009, the U.S. housing crash of 2008 
in the United States appeared to significantly inhibit military relations with Brazil. The 
inhibiting of relations is also exemplified by arms transfers falling to zero by 2009. 
4. Barack Obama (2009–2016) 
Recognizing Brazil’s soft-power investment into their domestic economy, 
President Obama constructed the most influential circumstances for meeting Brazilian 
leadership in 2011.190 “When Obama visited in 2011 he brought about fifty CEOs from 
 
188 Christensen, 278. 
189 Christensen, 278. 
190 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Communique by President Obama and President 




top American businesses and met several hundred Brazilian business leaders.”191 A year 
following this meeting, President Rousseff traveled to Washington and again followed-up 
on similar discussions relating to shared interest of economic prosperity centered around 
globalization as energy. Additionally, this meeting by Rousseff resulted in a newly 
established defense cooperation dialogue within both the United States Department of 
Defense as well as the Defense Ministry of Brazil.192 Other notable remarks came from 
Obama who made assurances to supporting Brazil joining the UN Security Council which 
while it has not been achieved, still appears to have levels of optimism vice no support 
from U.S. leadership that would severely limit any future accommodation of Brazil into 
the council.  
Michael Shifter wrote in his work titled Obama and Latin America: New 
Beginnings, Old Frictions that changing relations between the United States and Latin 
America and especially with Brazil were developing as President Obama took 
presidency.193 He noted that “Obama’s likeability contrasted sharply with his 
predecessor’s, significantly enhancing the favorable image of the United States.”194 Shifter 
goes on to present data from the Pew Research Center stating that “in Brazil last year 
confidence in Obama was 76 percent, a dramatic increase from the 17 percent that Bush 
registered in 2008.”195  
Obama’s presidential term, albeit starting on a high note compared to Bush as 
presented above and the noted attempts to forge bilateral trade and investment, perhaps 
was limited by the larger scope of U.S. security interest in the Middle East. Obama 
supported India to gain permanent membership on the UNSC as U.S. interest in gaining 
well-supported allies as perhaps a buffer to China were noted. Conversely, Brazil has no 
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real option to lend itself a buffer to the United States from major global enemies like Russia 
or China, making it difficult to substantiate greater immediate support to the UNSC that 
Brazil desires.196 Additionally, noted in Rousseff’s section below, was the scandal that 
appeared to have a large impact on any palpable negotiations that might have come as result 
of the increasing interaction between the two leaders. Obama’s focus also appeared to have 
remained on the economic rebound that his presidency inherited which also might have 
perhaps required a lot of his attention.  
A change in relations toward Latin American appears to stem from domestic change 
insisted by Obama as his campaign slogan read “change we can believe in” a large 
emphasis on the change that lay in the domestic economy as he took office a year after the 
housing crash. Additionally, the American people appeared to be growing tired with U.S. 
action in the Middle East. For those two areas mentioned it appeared a legacy of “change,” 
noted personally by Obama while also being the first elected African American President 
of the United States, extended into his foreign policy. Specifically, relations with Brazil 
appeared to get off to a great start as arms transfers grew incredibly 5 years after he took 
office. Efforts taken to improve bilateral trade agreements and U.S. investment into Brazil 
also appeared to be on par as Obama facilitated meetings with big businesses of both 
countries in official visits.  
a. Rousseff (2011–2016) 
An intelligence scandal involving the U.S. National Security Administration, 
President Rousseff’s personal communications as well as leading oil company Petrobras 
became a decisive obstruction to smooth relations developing between Obama and 
Rousseff.197 This scandal became so large that a visit to Washington by Rousseff in 2013 
had to be cancelled and future relations established, those that occurred in 2012, appeared 
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to have found themselves derailed.198 According to SIPRI, arms transfers from the United 
States to Brazil from 2009 to 2016, went from zero in 2009 to as high as 111 million in 
2012, a time when relations and dialogue appeared to really be taking off, to then and 
finishing at 31 million in 2016.199 President Rousseff also made another formal visit to 
Washington in 2015 in which security agreements, cemented around the newly formed 
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which according to a 
write-up on the meeting and the importance of GSOMIA in that it “will allow for a greater 
flow of information, goods, services, and technologies to advance the security of both 
countries.”200 
The Iran nuclear program became a contentious security interest of the United 
States through the Bush as well as Obama term which resulted in a divergence of 
understanding between the two countries. While Cardoso signed the last NPT ensuring 
only uranium enrichment for energy, Lula debated U.S. nuclear supremacy and the 
sanctioning of Iran, or as Brazil’s grievance appeared to be the limitations the United States 
placed on developing countries. Rousseff was noted for making attempts to absolve the 
friction by terminating support for Iran and ultimately re-align Brazil and U.S. security 
interest but after the NSA incident Rousseff believed the United States only wanted to 
strengthen their relations to have a window into Brazilian regional hegemony. Rousseff 
insisted that the United States take the developing relations with Brazil as that of having a 
relation with another global power.  
Rousseff presidency appeared to have a good deal of autonomy and opportunity to 
change relations with the United States, especially as 2009 arms transfers were at zero. A 
big setback appeared to be the NSA scandal in which arms transfers went from zero in 
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2009 to 111 million in 2012, but after the scandal and by the end of Rousseff’s term in 
2016 arms transfers shrunk down to 31 million. Conversely, Obama also appeared to have 
a majority of focus domestically, as noted earlier, on rebuilding the economy after the 2008 
housing crash as well as curtailing U.S. troop involvement in the Middle East amongst 
other areas. In other words, despite the NSA scandal it appears overall that military security 
relations were converging.  
C. CONCLUSION 
After delving into each presidential term an analysis and conclusion will encompass 
each decade to show notable trends in how leaders’ decisions in foreign policy indicate 
change in military relations. Again, the use of SIPRI arms transfers from the United States 
to Brazil are used as the litmus test against the factors of leadership. Also, along with arms 
transfers, notable interactions between presidents are weighed for implications of their 
relation to displaying a change in relations as met by arms transfers.  
Scaling back and reviewing the first decade of the 1990s it appeared both countries 
leaders were given or had accomplished a great deal of autonomy to expand their influence 
of foreign policy to strengthen military relations. The United States being freed of the 
bipolar entanglement with Russia with the ending of the Cold War had allowed President 
Bush and his predecessor Clinton to change the landscape of trade agreements throughout 
the Western Hemisphere. Despite trade relation, while not entirely aligned with Brazil, as 
the failed development of the FTAA had not been met by Brazil with open arms, SIPRI 
arms transfers throughout the 1990s had increased.201 Additionally, both Franco and 
Cardoso signed Nonnuclear proliferation treaty agreements that aligned well with SIPRI 
arms trade data indicating perhaps the growing convergence in security relations between 
both presidents.202 Also, rhetoric as well as information shared on the similarities in 
personal characteristics between Clinton and Cardoso, both being deep intellectuals, also 
implicate the noted insistence of Cardoso to sign the NPT agreement, which although was 
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not advocated by his administration, brought security interest of Brazil closer to those of 
the United States. 
The 2000s ushered in a whole new host of overwhelming concerns for the Bush 
administration. As rhetoric was just gaining momentum between Bush and Silva the 
terrorist attack of 9/11 had appeared to be directing the majority of United States interest 
to the Middle East. SIPRI arms transfers would also show a compelling story of the United 
States preoccupation with the GWOT as arms transfers went from 111 million in 2001 to 
zero by 2009.203 Some semblance of increasing relations with Silva’s presidency appeared 
to remain consistently autonomous over its influence in foreign affairs as Cason and 
Powers showed that even higher levels of travel occurred for Silva than presidents 
before.204  
The 2010s appeared to have renewed military relations as an increase in both arms 
transfers and notable rhetoric between presidents occurred. Even Brazilians had taken a 
greater liking to Obama vice Bush as mentioned by the Pew research survey. Also, SIPRI 
shows arms transfers going from zero in 2009 to as high as 111 million in 2012. 
Unfortunately, the noted NSA scandal in 2014 was not taken very lightly by Rousseff as 
state visits were cancelled as well as a significant drop in arms transfers from 111 million 
in 2012 to 31 million by 2016. Additionally, it also appeared President Obama had lost 
some autonomy in foreign policy as the American people pressed hard for U.S. troop 
disengagement from the Middle East.  
Military relations in the 1990s appeared to be greater than those in the 2000s. 
Factors, such as legacies and personal characteristics, may have played the most prominent 
role in leader’s decisions of foreign policy and may have influenced leadership decisions 
and their impact on change in military relations. The autonomy created for both countries 
as noted by the ending Cold War and economic growth through liberalization also 
facilitated more engagement between both countries. The 2000s showed more semblance 
of views toward autonomy, but in the opposite view, as the United States preoccupation 
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with GWOT limited growing relations between the two countries. The 2010s again revived 
perspectives of personal legacies as Obama was rebuilding the United States economically 
and Rousseff appeared to be equally engaged in diversifying foreign investment after China 
became Brazil’s leading country for exports in 2009. Obama and Rousseff’s state visits 
also brought major exchanges for both trade and advancing on military relations. Arms 
transfers appeared mildly effected by the noted scandal but overall relations between both 
countries were much better than the previous decade.  
It is difficult to devote one factor of leadership as the sole indicator of changing 
military security relations. A combination of legacies, autonomy to influence foreign 
policy, and personal characteristics appears to complement each other as indicators of how 
those factors influence foreign policy of leadership that effects military security relations. 
The time noted in this chapter was almost three decades, with varying levels of 
convergence and divergence, all of which appeared to align well when balancing those 
factors noted with arms transfers as well as at times even rhetoric shared.  
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IV. HOW DOES BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE 
OPERATIONS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN 
STATES INDICATE A CHANGE IN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH 
THE UNITED STATES? 
This chapter reviews the peace operations conducted by both the United States and 
Brazil and how those operation have evolved over the last three decades. More specifically, 
Brazil and United States engagement in peace operations –under the umbrella of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Organization for American States (OAS)—to 
combat humanitarian crises and threats toward democratic stability. Specifically, this 
chapter analyzes how each operation has presented patterns or trends in motivations that 
indicate changes in military security relations that may result in converging or diverging. 
Patterns of international and domestic circumstances appear to be key factors in how each 
country converges or diverges within the USNC and the OAS from decade to decade. In 
other words, the patterns of mutual engagement in these institutions appear to be related to 
the economic development of Brazil as well as the foreign policy of executive leadership 
of both countries.  
This chapter first provides an overview of the UNSC and OAS, followed by 
analyses of the 1995’s civil war in Angola, 1999 East Timor crises, 2004 Haiti 
humanitarian crisis, and the 2013 Lebanon civil war. These crises exemplify the patterns 
of divergence and convergence that implicate a change in military security relations.  
A. BACKGROUND ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL  
The United Nations Security Council was created toward in 1945 at the end of 
World War II.205  This development was set in place around the four winning nations of 
the war plus one—the United States, the USSR, Britain, France, and China as the plus 
one—with six other members joining by vote in a revolving two year membership. Since 
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then the number of those voted into a two-year terms has increased to 10 making 15 total 
members at any given time on the security council.206 The rules for membership are noted 
by author Dimitris Bourantonis in his work The History and Politics of UN Security 
Council Reform: “the UN charter set two basic criteria to be applied in the election of non-
permanent members, namely, ‘contribution of the members of the United Nations to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the organization’ 
and ‘equitable geographical distribution’ (Article 23).”207 A large aspect of those who hold 
permanent memberships is their ability to veto decisions made by the other six non-
permanent members emphasizing the significance of holding permanent membership.  
According to Bourantonis, the end of the Cold War signified a change in UNSC 
involvement of the United States because the Cold War had created a bipolar standoff 
between the United States and USSR. He continues that the Post-Cold War change resulted 
in freedom given to the United States allowing more openness toward UNSC involvement. 
significant change in that the involvement of great powers (Allied Powers—Britain, United 
States, France, USSR plus China and Axis Powers—Germany and Japan) pre and post-
Cold War within the UNSC had occurred. Additionally, restructuring of global powers as 
the Cold War continued saw the rise in both Germany and Japan along with a host of 
African nations while Britain and France’s influence eroded.208 Post-Cold-War 
cooperation within the UNSC, as noted by Bourantonis, was even achieved between the 
United States and Russia as well as China as he notes their involvement in “the Iran-Iraq 
war, and the crisis over Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia and Namibia.”209  He continues 
by offering that the most notable joint effort by these countries was in the Gulf War since 
it was “the first time since the Korean War (1950–3), the Security Council was able to 
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invoke Chapter VII to undertake military action against a state it deemed to be an 
aggressor.”210  
Additionally, noted by Derek Reveron, the United Nations Agenda was established 
in 1992 clarifying the UN members direction toward peace operations. He notes from that, 
the agenda made encouraged those involved in UN peace initiates “to stand ready to assist 
in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of 
nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among 
nations formerly at war.”211 Bourantonis also holds that in the twenty-first century, Russia 
as well China hold their seat on the UNSC as  result of “population and territorial size.”212 
More research recently conducted by Lisa Hultman who focused on the causes that 
have evoked greater interest in peace operations by the UNSC, from the early 1990s to the 
mid 2000s and not country specific, resulted in showing that conflict involving innocent 
civilian deaths had in fact resulted in more UN engagement by and large.213  She noted 
that events such as Rwanda and Bosnia, where innocent civilian casualties were high, had 
consequently brought the UNSC to enact a larger number of mandates for civilian 
protection.214  These mandates enacted by the UNSC for greater civilian protection appear 
to have ultimately led to new opportunities for countries to practice efforts in global 
security outreach and advance military security relations. As seen in Figure 6, from 2008 
to 2017, UNSC involvement in peace operations by all countries combined is significant 
portion of the all combined efforts in peace operations. The figure displays not only the 
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authority of the organization but the legitimacy and precedence it holds over regional and 
ad hoc coalition operations.215  
   
Figure 6. Peace Operations from 2008–2017 by Organization Provided by 
SIPRI216  
Additionally, Figure 6 shows not only an importance of the UNSC peace operations 
but also the significance of the amount of regional peace operations conducted. Discussed 
next is a brief overview of the OAS and its relevance as regional institution to indicating 
change in military security relations between both the United States and Brazil. 
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B. BACKGROUND ON THE OAS 
The development of the Organization of American States began shortly after the 
United Nations Security Council was created in 1948.217 During the period discussed in 
this review, the agenda and purpose for the OAS as noted by Mônica Herz in The 
Organization of American States (OAS) Global Governance Away from the Media, 
Routledge Global Institutions is that “the security agenda of the organization has expanded 
significantly to include transnational criminality, post-conflict peace building and a human 
security dimension.”218 Like the UNSC, development and growing reform occurred in two 
stages which were pre and post-Cold War.219 As an adaptation to the changing world order, 
the OAS development mirrored the same guidelines as the United Nations and both 
institution were heavily forged during the cold war. One difference between the creation 
of the two is that roots grown pre-World War II by Franklin Delanor Roosevelt’s ‘Good 
Neighbor Policy,’ a non-interventionist mandate, along with the initial drafting of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA) in Rio de Janerio post World War II 
that established the collective security arrangement in the region.220 This treaty 
encompassed the same system of the United Nations imposing the requirement for a 
collective agreement between all parties before the use of force is considered, as well as 
treating conflict involving one state therefor involving all states in peace settlement. Finally 
a few years later, the official draft of the OAS would be signed with the addition of 
“principles contained in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, namely that the regional 
organizations should play a part in the peaceful settlement of disputes and that their role in 
peace enforcement is subordinated to the UN Security Council.”221 Shown in Figure 7 is 
a snapshot of the OAS peace missions conducted from 1990 to the present. 
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Figure 7. OAS Peace Missions from 1990 to Present222 
Monica Herz notes the similarity in creation between the OAS and United Nations 
during the Cold War in that “It was necessary to adapt the inter-American system to this 
new international reality, in particular to the institutional format generated by the United 
Nations.”223  She continues over the relation to the Cold War by saying “In fact the Cold 
War framed international relations during most of the time of the existence of the OAS, 
and the manner in which the dispute between the two superpowers and the two social 
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systems which they represented took shape in the Americas market the history of the 
OAS.”224  
C. A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON PEACE OPERATIONS 
As background for understanding how the United States carries out peace 
operations the use of the United States Joint Force Publication Peace Operations is 
referenced. This document lays out the different types of peace operations conducted by 
the United States. Those operations include: Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), Peace 
Enforcement Operations (PEO), Peace Building (PB), Peace Making (PM), and Conflict 
Prevention (CP).225 The document also gives a brief description of each such as PKO being 
used for long-term political stability, PEO being the use of force or threat of force to 
provide immediate protection to those succumbing from humanitarian atrocities, PB being 
conducted after high-intensity battles are over and form into a long-term process for 
stability, PM emphasizing diplomacy to end kinetic exchanges, and CP to diffuse both inter 
and intra state discord and limit its escalation into kinetic exchanges.226  
Delving deeper into peace operations, noted by the U.S. military directive, that U.S. 
military involvement largely encompasses most efforts within PKO and PEO while the 
others remain in the sphere of state department representative initiatives.227 Noted 
examples of PKO include “as vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, local negotiations between 
rival forces, and special investigations.”228 For PEO, examples include “the enforcement 
of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel conducting HA, restoration of 
order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.”229 Given the 
military involvement within these specific uses of peace operations as noted by the U.S. 
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military publication, events discussed going further will reside within the areas defined 
above.  
D. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNSC 
The United States has been the lead contributor to peace operations through the 
United Nations since its conception in 1945.230 However, Stewart Patrick in Return to 
Realism? The United States and Global Peace Operations since 9/11, notes “Since the end 
of the cold war, the United States has adopted an ambivalent, selective and often 
inconsistent position toward UN peace operations.”231  Specifically, actions by the United 
States carried out in partnership with the United Nations, that “the United States has 
generally limited its own participation in UN-led peace operations to materiel and logistical 
support, preferring to engage its troops only in operations run by NATO or by an ad hoc, 
US-led coalition of the willing, particularly as part of the US-directed ‘war on 
terrorism.’”232  
Ramesh Thakur shows similar views on U.S. involvement with the United Nations, 
specifically throughout the 1990s in indirect support, but also offers a noticeable change in 
the way the United States approached new ways to integrate themselves into the 
organization. Thakur notes that Bush Sr. had facilitated a widening perspective of U.S. 
operations within the organization in that  
on 12 September [1992] where Bush announced that the USA was prepared 
to introduce a peacekeeping curriculum in U.S. military schools; to train 
combat, engineering, and logistical units for international peace-keeping 
duties; and to open U.S. military bases for multinational training and field 
exercises.233 
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Thakur also emphasized the tension between U.S. policymakers in deciding on 
further engagement of the United States with the UN and those who were not in favor. 
Noting that those in favor of more participation expressed views toward the evolving post-
Cold War global design of international security and peace initiatives that are now a 
responsibility of the United States to work alongside the United Nations. Those not in favor 
noted how U.S. military involvement would decapitate much needed skills and 
requirements to maintain the highly effective force the United States had developed as 
result of increased lethality brought on by Cold War fears.234 It appears given the 
unipolarity the United States enjoyed during the 1990s, remaining viable and relevant to 
global security, required participation in global security initiatives.  
While new opportunities of U.S. involvement in peace operations appeared to 
present themselves throughout the 1990s, growing political skepticism also grew, as author 
Ramesh Thakur notes that skepticism came as a result of failed efforts by UN led initiatives 
in Bosnia.235 Additionally, an early strategy within the Clinton administration was to 
intertwine U.S. interest alongside efforts led by the United Nations, obstacles followed on 
the battlefield by allowing U.S. troops to operate as a subordinate to UN commanders 
would ultimately lead to U.S. disengagement from direct support to the organization.236 
This strategy is exemplified in the Bosnia crisis, viewed as a failure in UN led peace 
operations, that resulted in major U.S. casualties—18 army rangers—and ultimately 
leading the United States to lay major blame to the organization of which a consequent 
divergence in efforts as the United States began directing operations by U.S. commanders 
alongside the UN commanders.237  
E. BRAZIL AND THE UNSC  
Understanding why Brazil involves itself in peace operations under the UNSC’s 
authority appears to evolve around gaining legitimacy as a country capable of leading 
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missions in efforts to gain permanent membership. (Notable efforts to gain permanent 
membership are also discussed in the next section.) Categorizing all Latin America 
countries’ involvement in UNSC peace operations, and not specifically Brazil,  has been 
acknowledged by Arturo Sotomayor. In his work Latin America’s Experience with Peace 
Support Operations from: Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security Routledge, he 
contends that  
Although states’ motivations to participate in UN peace operations vary 
substantially  from case to case, we can identify three general reasons why 
Latin American states participate in peacekeeping: 1 (1) democratization 
and impetus for military reform, (2)  international prestige and status, and 
(3) evolving regional norms about intervention.238 
While Brazil has made a transition to democracy within the time period discussed, 
reviewing the above motivations, it appears Brazil would most fit into the field of using 
UN peace operations to gain international prestige and status as chapters before have 
repeatedly noted. Although, as Brazil has always been determined to respect the 
sovereignty of other nations, tendencies to engage in peace operations also are perhaps 
hindered by long establish norms within their society that emphasize sovereign rights. 
Regional, as well as international norms of protecting human rights also appears to present 
a way around Brazil’s respect for sovereignty in cooperating with regional partners to 
conduct peace operations.   
More criticism for Brazilian led Peace Operations, notes author João Paulo S. 
Alsina Júnior in his article Grand Strategy and Peace Operations: the Brazilian Case has 
been discussed despite a ten year period in which Brazil, while leading MINUSTAH, had 
not recorded one death.239 That criticism, such as Brazil not endeavoring any real 
dangerous missions as well as the fallacy of legitimacy gained through the use of peace 
operations, comes as a result of the limited level of threats sustained in Peace Operations 
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conducted by Brazil.240 João emphasizes the growing complexity of the security 
environment as well as increased hazards that will challenged Brazilian led efforts. In other 
words, as environments that require new peace initiatives increase in level of danger it 
appears Brazil’s involvement will become more and more under international scrutiny. For 
the United States, accomplishing Peace Operation has always brought on intense scrutiny 
from high-level commanders in that the belief of conducting such operations limits the 
effectiveness of military forces used in large scale wars.241  
Short-term peace operations carried out by Brazil appear to have long-term goals. 
For example, the peace operation held in Haiti in 2010, where the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) asked for Brazil’s involvement, did so with the long-term goal of showing both 
the United States as well as the UNSC that they have the capacity to be a formal member 
of the security council. Additionally, successful completion of the mission and skills 
developed by aiding in the restoration of Haiti’s civil society were then brought back to 
Brazil for use domestically. As noted by Author Marcelo Valenca and Gustavo Carvalho 
in their work Soft Power, Hard Power Aspirations: the Shifting Role of Power in Brazilian 
Foreign Policy that,  
Although Brazil deployed more troops than any other country in UNEF, 
UNAVEM III, and UNMISET, Haiti was the first time the UNSC appointed 
it to command a peace operation, and Brazilian policymakers have 
considered it an opportunity to show that, due to its different approach to 
peacekeeping, Brazil is able to handle peace-keeping and international 
security tasks of greater magnitude and difficulty.242  
The authors capture the importance of Brazil engaging in these operations as not 
only the opportunity to gain global legitimacy but also change the views of the United 
States military leaders in showing a greater capability in their ally to the south.  
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Brazil, as a debated emerging power on many grounds both economically and 
militarily,243 still poses a security (unity of effort) challenge to the United States in finding 
the best way to accommodate Brazil’s greater integration into the international security 
environment specifically within pre-established international institutions like the UNSC. 
Motivations for using peace operations as a means to buy into membership on the UNSC 
also appear to coincides with Brazil’s international strategic economic goals of slowly 
maturing their country. Author Thierry Tardy notes on those motivations which are  
“…largely about projecting power, hard and soft.”244 As for peace operations being 
another use of soft-power development, chosen so hastily by Brazil, noted from Tardy is 
that “Through peacekeeping and peacebuilding, states can both buttress narrowly defined 
interests and push their normative agendas at a relatively low cost.”245 The post-Cold War 
era saw emerging economies in India as well as Brazil by the early 2000s leading their 
agenda again toward discussions of change in permanent membership within the UNSC. 
The low cost for enhancing Brazilian legitimacy among global powers through peace 
operations appears to be an incentive for Brazil.  
1. Deeper Review of Brazil and the UNSC 
At the turn of the 21st century, Brazil had gone from ranking 44th of UN 
contributors to 13th by 2010 with involvement from over 2000 personnel.246 A depiction 
of growing Brazilian involvement in UN operations is shown in Figure 8. This statistic 
mightily emphasizes the two ways that Brazil and the United States can improve 
hemispheric relations. First, Brazil’s ability to contribute greater efforts toward regional 
security alleviates the United States from using resources that can be otherwise used in 
areas pertinent to U.S. National Security, interest such as peace and stability of the middle 
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east. Secondly, Brazil being the south-south leader of regional stability develops the 
legitimacy needed not only to gain official membership to the USNC but also as a more 
attractive partner for trade and investment by the United States.  
 
Figure 8. A Chronological Order of Brazilian Involvement in UNSC Peace 
Missions247 
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Surprisingly, the appearance of further convergence between the United States and 
Brazil through peace operations has come from the pragmatic learning experiences Brazil 
has accumulated since increasing involvement in peace operations. Experiences in Haiti in 
2010 exemplify how pragmatism has diverted previously held emphasis on sovereignty 
and consent when confronted with large swaths of criminal activities encountered during 
that required more conflict management.248 Recognition over the successful peace 
operations held in Haiti also opened other opportunities for Brazil. 
As a result of limited resources in aid from the United States to civil conflict in 
Lebanon in 2011 the UN called for others to provide support. Answering that call was 
Brazil, largely as a result of the recognition in success of operations in Haiti, who for the 
first time utilized a naval asset for UN operations—Brazilian frigate União (F45)—by 
integrating into the United Nations Maritime Task Force (MTF).249 While Brazil and the 
United States did not necessarily get to collectively work together in this effort, it appears 
that Brazil provided relief by replacing the United States as a global actor in peace 
operations allowing the United States to remain focused on Middle East peace operations.  
2. Brazil’s Effort to Become an Official Member of the UNSC 
While Brazil has always sought to gain permanent membership on the United 
Nations Security Council, when asked to act upon its governing mandates, it has done so 
with careful consideration of not violating the sovereignty of countries. In recent years, 
adding even more contention over decisions made by the UN and noted in opening by 
Harold Trinkunas and David Mares, is how Brazil has made a valiant attempts to re-write 
a much debated UN principle of “responsibility to protect” with their view called 
“responsibility while protecting.”250 Again, the change offered by Brazil seeks to improve 
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transparency in decisions made unilaterally or through internationally consenting 
institutions while also giving new options in how to intervene through various ways of 
peace operations in crisis response. It also appears, due to the historical human rights 
offenses carried out by a military led Brazilian government, domestic support to engage in 
peace operations might be a more viable option to give the military a purpose. 
Additionally, capability gaps appear to exist in Brazil’s military force as 
modernization efforts have been a major focal point of their force since the 2000s. 
Capability gaps, while perhaps a result of moderate economic growth and both domestic 
and foreign policy decision by the executive powers—through budget cuts global security 
interest—impede Brazil’s ascent into permanent membership of the UNSC. Another 
perspective could be that over the last 26 years covered, Brazil has come a long ways 
economically and politically that have translated well into military modernization efforts 
as well as initiatives of operations within the UNSC. But, the UN initiatives taken by 
Brazil, while judged by some as arbitrarily chosen or loosely in line with post-colonial and 
cultural similarities—Africa and regionally located countries like Haiti—have actually 
been intricately decided upon for different reasons. One reason is that by including 
progressively more and more over time (as has happened in the time period covered) in 
parallel to growing both economic and foreign policy influence globally, may result in one 
day having significant leverage to join as a permanent member. A low level interpretation 
of permanent members, especially the United States, appears to show that Brazil’s military 
capabilities are less capable and positioned for a large war or peace initiative both 
unilaterally or multilaterally within the UNSC. Another member, France, has been noted 
to aid in the nuclear submarine development of Brazil for protection of the blue water 
shoreline discovery in oil noted previously.251  Force sizes of Brazil, while modest in size, 
are going to require greater levels of technological advances to achieve local development 
of top of the line military hardware such as first generation fighter planes, nuclear powered 
submarines, and satellite infrastructure to support complex networked integration of these 
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assets.252 Considering Brazils military in the aggregate despite some gaps in data before 
2005, according to Janes has consisted of an army of a 195,000 members (since 2005) to 
around 240,000 by 2010, Sailors (since 2008) of around 60,000 and remaining consistent  
while the Airforce (since 2007) show numbers increasing from 50,000 in 07 to 65,000 by 
2010.253 
As for defense spending overall, records indicate that from 1990 to 2000 spending 
as a percentage of GDP had sat close to only two percent with minor fluctuation.254 In the 
2000s, a large jump in spending occurred from 2005 to 2010 of around 25% but since then 
have not been any higher. Military spending as a percentage of the GDP from 2010 to 2016, 
lower than that of the 1990s, has also stayed close to 1.5 percent throughout.255 From the 
numbers above it appears military expenditure over the time period covered in this study 
have dropped. Despite military expenditures dropping, a review in peace operations may 
bring another concern as increases since the 2010s have been noted.256 
F. BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND UNSC PEACE OPERATIONS  
While the size of Brazilian military force has not changed significantly over the 
time period covered, limited involvement in the UNSC operations appears to be a result of 
desired foreign policy decisions as well as economic development achieved. Next, a 
breakdown of UN involvement that encompassed literary notes on both countries as 
appearing as an outlier or of noteworthy toward the greater understanding of other 
indicators discussed in previous chapters as well as implications toward the significance of 
the security institutions themselves. 
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1. 1990–2000 Observations 
a. Gulf War (1990–2000) 
While U.S. involvement in the Gulf War had occurred without Brazilian 
participation, noted here is how U.S. national interest of the importance of the middle east 
perhaps created a divergence in U.S-Brazil mutual cooperation. The post-Cold War 
changing world order had led the United States to take on new initiatives in peace 
operations within the United Nations. Despite Brazil being a primary exporter of arms to 
Iraq as discussed earlier, the United States not only insisted they stop, but then through 
national interest developed partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. Military 
security relations expressed again in arms sales, the U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia 
doubled from 1990 to 1999 by 1 billion dollars, in Egypt from 1990 to 1994 from 430 
million to 1.7 billion, and Jordan from 16 million in 1990 to 248 million by 1998.257  
For Brazil, efforts to take part in the Gulf War not only were obfuscated by arms 
trading dilemmas to the Saddam regime, but also in recognizing the limited capability that 
their military forces held at this time. Daniel Zirker, in The Brazil Military and the New 
World Order captured the recognition of limitations within Brazilian military force by 
noting that “Moreover, military officers were pointedly aware of the inferiority of the 
Brazilian armed forces compared to those even of Iraq.”258 Additionally, on top of the 
armed forces being met with capability limitations, their influence and place within the 
newly constructed democracy was still be developed during this time. Emphasis during the 
early years of democratic consolidation were on budget cuts of the military to acceptable 
levels for defense of the homeland and not to a grand scale.259 
b. Angola (1995) 
Noted as the first time Brazil sent a sizable amount of troops for UN peace 
operations, Angola’s UN initiative termed UNAVEM III was the third mandate released 
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by the UN to use military intervention to achieve peaceful reconciliation of a country 
crushed by civil war.260 Here, Brazilian military involvement included over 4000 men.261 
While in this instance, U.S. involvement was not acknowledged the importance of not only 
how many Brazilian troops were sent, but it was done under the mandate of the UNSC. 
The importance of the institution, to be relevant and present as a tool for Brazil to commit 
such a large force to while showing the United States that they have a part to play in global 
security is important.  
c. East Timor (1999) 
The conflict in East Timor, included the United States devoting the 31st Marine 
expeditionary Unit via the USS Belleau Wood for search and rescue as well as logistical 
and communications support.262 Additionally, Brazilian involvement, while small with 
only 5 military personnel, was seen as significant given the location and far-reaching 
connotation that came as result of their participation.263 In this instance, sited by author 
W. Alejandro Sánchez Nieto in his work Brazil’s Grand Design for Combining Global 
South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti 
and Timor, stemming from culturally connected overtones and gestures had allowed Brazil 
to find a way to gain influence over East Timor while defending the country from 
Indonesia.264 This influence gained by Brazil was vocalized in the country by advocating 
for Brazil’s permanent seat in the USNC265 and appearing to align nicely with a long 
conspired interest of Brazil.  
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While the timing of Brazil’s involvement, during Franco’s term in 1994, shows 
autonomy to conduct new avenues of foreign policy but given limited GDP growth at that 
time also aligns with the minimal involvement of only providing five military 
personnel.266 Nieto emphasized cultural connections that bound Brazil’s involvement into 
the conflict which may have been sought out by Franco among options to expand Brazilian 
influence into the UNSC in hopes of one day obtaining a permanent seat.267 Ultimately, it 
appeared that a both economic development and foreign policy decisions had a  mild 
impact on Brazil’s involvement but the goal of permanent membership to the UNSC was 
by this time established and efforts toward achieving that goal were underway.  
2. 2000–2010 Observations 
a. Haiti (2004) 
The participation of Brazil in Haiti was noted as a significant by authors João Paulo 
S. Alsina Júnior a result of Brazil’s historical involvement until that time leading up to 
2000s as “… contributions tended to focus on Portuguese-speaking countries (Angola, East 
Timor).”268 Brazil, whose involvement would last until the end of the 2000s involved over 
1000 troops who worked endlessly to diffuse civil discourse within the country and 
neutralize aggressive belligerent’s. Additionally, as noted previously in chapter 3, the 
Brazilian military used the opportunity of Haiti civil war as a way of training to use later 
as law enforcement domestically. While Brazil was a leader in this UN mandated peace 
operation, United States initial involvement remained minimal to only protecting the 
embassy. Shortly after turmoil appeared to have grown the United States committed over 
200 military troops in support.  
Brazil’s involvement in Haiti and leadership is also noted as significant by author 
Gelson Fonseca Jr. in work Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy as 
he notes that “not only due to the dimension of this engagement in material and human 
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terms, but also because it signals a willingness to more incisively assume a position of 
command in the solution of regional crises.”269 Brazil appeared to have lifted a burden 
from the United States from treading a fine line in involvement, which they also had done 
so in the 1990s that resulted in  major backlash among those in Brazil and other regional 
countries. Additionally, the United States was still engaged in the GWOT and Brazil’s 
involvement in this mission would also seem to have critically accommodated the U.S. 
interests of limited involvement while resources were occupied elsewhere.  
Understanding both countries’ involvement in Haiti should be done with 
consideration to the implications of larger forces bringing them together such as economic 
development and foreign policy. The countries’ involvement in the UNSC is an illustration 
of joint military collaboration, that in its own existence is more important than had it not 
occurred at all. Until Haiti 2004, Brazil and the United States had only seen mutual troop 
involvement in two UN peace operations—UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia and East 
Timor.270 Although, a major difference in Brazil in 2004 vice most of the 1990s, is the 
economic well-being that had jumped leaps as noted in Chapter II. Brazil’s economic 
development, along with greater autonomy in the executive branch’s ability to exercise 
foreign policy shed light on a larger significance to the Haiti UN peace operation led by 
Brazil.  
3. 2010–2016 Observations 
a. Lebanon 2013   
The importance of leadership’s autonomy to influence foreign policy is shown by 
Brazil’s efforts in Lebanon. Noted by Antonio Ruy Almeida Silva in The Brazilian 
participation in UNIFIL: raising Brazil’s profile in international peace and security in the 
Middle East? in which notes that “In 2003, Lula visited five Middle Eastern countries: 
Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. With this visit, Lula became 
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the first Brazilian head of state to visit the Middle East since Brazilian Emperor Pedro II’s 
visit to the region in 1871.”271 Prior to 2013 engagement by Brazil, both the United States 
and Brazil partnered for stability and protective actions in the country in 2006 during 
Lebanese domestic civil discourse.272 Brazil, showing greater capacity at that time to 
project power abroad appeared to find themselves intertwined in UN peace initiatives in 
Lebanon that led to its 2013 engagement. Also noted by Silva was the large number of 
families with ancestral ties between the two countries of Lebanon and Brazil.273 
As Brazil’s involvement with the middle east since the 2010s has only recently 
became more apparent, after reviewing its economic development over the course of the 
26 years covered, coupled with new levels of autonomy in executive power, UN peace 
operations are yet another avenue that Brazil can consistently build upon to exert more 
influence while also using that time on the world stage to continually “try-out” for a 
permanent role on the council. A convergence between the United States and Brazil 
military security relations has great opportunity as Brazil’s involvement in the middle east 
increases. Through lifting the burden of global security through engaging in greater 
involvement in the middle east will the United States conceivably view Brazil as a larger 
influence and peer vice traditionally as just the regional leader of the southern western 
hemisphere. An ever pressing concern of those who believe Brazil’s expanding 
involvement in UN peace operations is merely done only as a low cost attempt to gain 
permanent membership may be missing the long-term strategic goals Brazil has appeared 
to develop since the 1990s. Cooperation in UN security council peace operations and its 
relation to gaining legitimacy or even the possibility of reaching permanent membership 
also appears to demand a whole host of foundational platitudes and milestones such as 
those noted of economic development and greater capacity to take on international conflicts 
beyond its regional territory. It appears that the United States and Brazilian efforts in UN 
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Peace Operations were not as robust as the two countries would have preferred. It now 
appears that the slow maturing of Brazil’s economy and international presence met with 
possibly the declining international influence of the United States may lead to greater 
mutual efforts in military security relations as directed by the UNSC.  
G. BRAZIL AND UNITED STATES OPERATING WITHIN THE OAS   
The United States involvement in the OAS, as noted by Michael Shifter in the Inter-
American Dialogue, that since the development in the 1940s until this recent decade the 
United States has led the funding of the organization while also maintaining headquarters 
in the United States. Also emphasized by Shifter is the criticism the United States has been 
dealt with since its inception with regards to how it uses its participation as another means 
to accomplish the sole interest of the United States. He continues on U.S. involvement in 
OAS peace operations that “ there are many signs that today the U.S. gives less importance 
to the OAS than it has in recent years.”274  Shifter also took note of important instances in 
the 1990s of OAS cohesion in tending to disruptions of democracy in countries such as “ 
Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996)” that the a largest 
criticism came in the limited efforts used in all cases.275  
The United States interaction in the OAS in the 2000s, a similarity to the UN 
involvement, where limitations were noted to exist as the GWOT had taken a majority of 
military security focus off to the middle east. For the OAS itself, rhetoric of irrelevance 
and ineptitude circulated around United States officials but noted development and greater 
capacity for conducting regional stability was acknowledged as shifter writes that “merely 
increasing U.S. attention will not remedy the OAS’s ills. Other key hemispheric 
countries—Mexico and Brazil for starters—also need to take the OAS more seriously for 
the organization to have a chance to fulfill its potential.”276 
 
274 Michael Shifter, “The U.S. and OAS: A Paradoxical Relationship,” Security Assistance Monitor, 




Encapsulating Brazilian led efforts toward joining the United States in ways to 
advance regional security, noted by Gelson Fonseca Jr. in Notes on the Evolution of 
Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy are his words emphasizing a historical narrative of Brazil 
and the United States coming together. He said,  
The multilateral focus was a constant in Brazilian diplomacy even before 
the creation of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations. To be precise, 
that focus first appeared in 1889 when Brazil attended a meeting of Western 
Hemi sphere countries in Washington, DC, convened by President Grover 
Cleve land. The meeting turned out to be the embryo of the Organization of 
American States (OAS). By participating in this meeting, Brazil implicitly 
accepted multilateralism as a useful means for advancing its national 
interests.277 
While remarks on the historical importance of both countries taking initiatives 
toward regional security, for Brazil, noted challenges toward advancing efforts in 
organization like the OAS remain in two areas according to Fonseca. The first one is 
recovering from the negative military dictatorship’s rule and actions in human rights and 
its limited international engagement while the other remains in line with economic 
development and leadership (see chapters 2 &3). He notes that “The second challenge is 
more complex and remains today: how can brazil use the political capital it gained from 
democratization—and later on, from economic stability—to explore new ways to project 
the country internationally.”278  His interpretation of Brazil overcoming these challenges 
appears to lead Brazil toward a more inclusive demeanor in not only regional organizations 
like the OAS, but global security apparatus as well. 
Others note challenges in defining the “problem” and corresponding correct way to 
intervene.279 Instances of lacking regional security initiatives in cases such as Ecuador in 
2000 were noted by Jennirfer L. McCoy in International Response to Democratic Crisis in 
the Americas, 1990–2005 in that efforts to disrupt a military led regime were successful 
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but the unconstitutional removal of the Haiti’s president had occurred.280 Additionally, 
noted by McCoy are the obstacles presented by actions taken of the OAS and its 
effectiveness to intervene as jurisdiction and coordination with global security groups such 
as the UNSC are required.281  
H. ANALYSIS 
A closure review of the time period covered, it appears that a few specific instances 
of the United States and Brazil operating within the UNSC clearly identify the argument 
presented, that through time, notwithstanding international and domestic circumstances 
that arise as well as actions of executive leadership, that countries involvement in the 
security institutions noted are indicative of a change in military security relations. The next 
section provides an analysis of how specific instances of both countries level of 
involvement exemplify how the institutions show that change.  
1. On Involvement with the UNSC  
Reviewing instances of involvement within the UNSC, in relation to the 
progression of time, it also appears that Brazil’s long-term decisions of both economic and 
foreign policy are now beginning able to display its ability to unilaterally decide upon how 
it intends to use the UNSC to their advantage. The United States involvement, while fairly 
consistent, appears to bring on much more criticism among members and those aspiring to 
become members. The first instance lending to the emphasis of both time and the relevance 
of the UNSC is the United States actions in the Gulf War. Where Brazil was noted for not 
participating as result of two separate and otherwise nonrelated reasons. The first was that 
the Saddam regime owed Brazil money for arms received and the other was that 
Washington insisted that Brazil stay out of the conflict.282 Fast-forward almost 20 years 
and through not only time—adding noted Brazil economic stability and foreign policy 
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involvement in Lebanon showed both countries had come together outside of their region 
in efforts toward global peace. Again, evidenced Brazil’s involvement in the Middle East, 
as the UN reached out to all members for assistance, and Brazil was poised to take on the 
request as its position both economically and in foreign policy were able to align with U.S. 
interest in matters of the Middle East. It appears as time continues Brazil will strategically 
advance themselves using the avenues of global and regional security apparatus to build its 
legitimacy abroad as well as justifying perhaps an expanding military force both in size 
and capability.  
Additionally, decisions by Brazil in its involvement in both the UNSC as well as 
the OAS have been taken strategically. The institutions discussed, have been in existence 
since the 1940s, and while Brazil’s military led regime from 1964–1985 had not changed 
its involvement, the importance of the institutions still remains along with the opportunity 
for renewed interest. The United States has always held a dominant role, both as funding 
member as well as involvement, and appears to be susceptible to international 
circumstances such as those in the Middle East—Gulf War, GWOT, issue with IRAN—as 
the decisions of its leaders in foreign policy as well as the global economic order are easily 
dissuaded in avenues leading them away from UNSC mandates that would otherwise not 
be solely of its own national interest. 
2. On Involvement with the OAS 
Fortunately, the United States and Brazil will always remain on the OAS as a 
permanent member unless they so choose to disengage. For the OAS, it appears to be a bit 
difficult to distinguish a noticeable break out between actions called by both the UNSC as 
well as the OAS, as the OAS acts as a subordinate to the UNSC. Noted previously, many 
request for action come from the United States, and while some believe these request only 
fall in line with its national interest, Brazil’s decision to align with those national interest 
may also indicate the advancement of mutual military security relations.  
While not extensively covered, Brazil’s lack of involvement and criticism of 
breaching sovereignty toward the United States in their actions in Haiti in 1993 where 
almost 20,000 U.S. troops were sent  is contrasted by Brazil subsequent involvement in the 
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country 10 years later. National interest aligning both countries, as shown in the Haiti 2004, 
of regional stability, in which an aggrandized effort by Brazil appears to show how aligning 
growing interest in regional stability had also brought both countries closer as the factor of 
both time in which Brazil’s economy has blossomed in the early 2000s as well as foreign 
policy of its leadership. Additionally, the importance of the OAS as the platform allowing 
both countries to come together—even if the U.S. presence surmounted to merely a couple 
hundred troops—does not diminish the importance of how Brazil and the United States 
involvement in the regional institution can be indicative of a change in military security 
relations.  
I. CONCLUSION 
The longstanding institutions of both the UNSC and the OAS appear to increasingly 
become more relevant for both the United States and Brazil. Additionally, Brazil’s 
involvement in global peace initiatives through these organizations may become more 
apparent as time progresses and Brazil’s domestic economic stability and decisions of 
foreign policy of its leadership varies in alignment of U.S. interest. Ultimately, strength of 
the intuitions to remain relevant will provide avenues for both countries to come together. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Concluding remarks will bring readers back to the stated hypotheses as well as 
findings and results. While each hypothesis appeared to be relevant as an indicator to 
change in military security relations between Brazil and the United States the time period 
covered also played a role. The time period observed began just after the Cold War and 
carried through the 2001 9/11 attacks as well as the 2008 great recession in the United 
States. Both international and domestic circumstances, observed over time, appear to have 
influenced the areas discussed in this thesis. Those areas include the economic 
development in Brazil, foreign policy decisions by both countries, and the countries’ 
involvement in both UNSC and OAS. Also, it is important to note that each hypothesis 
discussed should not be considered in a vacuum and that all three hypotheses remain 
complexly interwoven in significance toward providing implications of how changes in 
military security relations occurred.  
The thesis proposed the following question: What factors explain change in military 
security relations between the United States and Brazil? To answer the proposed question, 
three hypotheses were considered and are presented which are as follows:  
• Hypothesis one: Economic development of Brazil indicates a change 
military security relations as displayed in joint operations, treaties, as well 
as the transfer of material power. 
• Hypothesis two: Both countries’ executive leadership decisions of foreign 
policy have led to a change in military security relations. 
• Hypothesis three: Both countries’ involvement in international and 
regional security institutions indicate a change in military security 
relations. 
Next, for each hypothesis, concluding remarks will re-encapsulate the key findings. 
Lastly, a few recommendations are provided for policymakers and military leaders that 
90 
include the significance of these findings in relation to the Great Power Competition that 
the United States is embarking on globally. 
A. FINDINGS 
1. Hypothesis One: Findings and Remarks 
Does an increase in economic development of Brazil indicate a change in military 
security relations with the United States? It appears, as Brazil’s GDP has risen over the 
time period covered, consequently its potential to allocate funding toward its military has 
also risen. Additionally, its economic development had created a level of stability at home 
that allowed greater engagement of presidential foreign policy initiatives abroad, as noted 
in Chapter III, which appear to also show trends of increasing arms transfers from the 
United States to Brazil. Also, it was not purely Brazil’s economic growth that provided 
implications for a potential expansion in its military as well as engagement with United 
States; it also appears the way in which Brazil expanded their economy played a role. 
Expanding their economy, by liberalization as well as opening their markets up to 
international and regional institutions such as the WTO and Mercosul, allowed Brazil to 
develop relations beyond borders that previously had not existed.  
Furthermore, the Brazilian economic uptick that occurred in the 2000s alongside 
the United States effort in the GWOT showed a decrease in military security relations, but 
as the United States bounced back from its major recession it appeared the military security 
relations also followed. This pattern shows how important economic development is, as 
Brazil’s ability to maintain steady growth over a ten-year period was critical to have the 
ability to re-engage with the United States once the GWOT and recession had subsided. 
Sustained economic development by Brazil provided an indication of changing military 
security relations as shown by how the development in Brazil allowed its military to remain 
accessible for opportunities to participate with the United States. Adding to this highlighted 
pattern is that both countries signed on to the GSOMIA in 2010 which has displayed more 
interaction from where both countries’ relations had been in 1990.283  
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While economic development of Brazil has indicated a change in military security 
relations with the United States, it also appears that its economic development is not the 
only indication. The other areas of research appear to be intertwined with the importance 
of Brazilian economic growth and support the hypothesis of indicating change in military 
security relations. In sum, to succinctly answer the question of how Brazilian economic 
development indicated change in military security relations with the United States, the 
method of liberalization in economic development opened the gates toward having an 
open-ended opportunity for increasing shared mutual military security relations. These 
relations changed through economic development were also confronted by both countries’ 
balancing international effects. Factoring in time, of both international circumstances as 
well as economic growth in Brazil, the eventuality of both countries coming together was 
achieved.  
2. Hypothesis Two: Findings and Remarks  
In addition to the impact that Brazilian economic growth had in advancing military 
security relations, the foreign policy decisions by both countries’ executive leadership  
indicated change. The importance of factors of leadership, such as legacies, autonomy to 
influence foreign policy as a result of both domestic and international circumstances, and 
personal characteristics of each president all appeared relevant in the time period observed. 
Additionally, it appears that those factors influenced each presidents’ decisions in foreign 
policy, from 1990 to 2016, indicating changing military security relations through the 
expansion of arms sales.  
Moreover, each president was met with domestic and international circumstances 
that appeared to weigh heavily on their ability to advance further military relations. 
Domestic and international circumstances such as the domestic economy of Brazil or the 
GWOT of the United States both directed each executive office either toward or away from 
furthering relations. Over the time period covered, increasing or decreasing military 
security relations appeared to ebb and flow with rhetoric as well as the physical interaction 
between presidents. This is emphasized in observation at the end of the time period covered 
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as Obama and Rousseff made many attempts to collaborate both in Washington and in 
Brazil.  
While the factors influenced decisions of foreign policy made by both countries’ 
executive leadership, again the executive decisions made did not occur in a vacuum. 
Additional forces would compound the effect of leadership decisions in foreign policy. 
Those forces include sustained economic development by Brazil over the observed time 
period as well as the ever-changing dynamic of international influences. Those factors also 
impressed upon both countries’ leaders more or less autonomy to remain influential in 
foreign policy and appears to provide an indication of how military security relations were 
affected.  
3. Hypothesis Three: Findings and Remarks 
Both countries’ involvement in the United Nations Security Council and the OAS 
was an indicator of change in military security relations. Besides involvement in the UNSC 
and OAS, both countries interacted more in leading peace initiatives globally and the 
interaction itself is an indicator of change as Brazil’s ability to project power increases. 
While both countries’ involvement in these institutions increased considerably over time, 
it appears Brazil’s involvement has changed the dynamics of advancing military security 
relations between both countries the most, as their involvement has expanded to new 
regions such as the Middle East. This is evidenced by its position in the beginning of the 
study, having mostly engaged with the United States on regional and international security 
concerns while unilaterally engaging in other areas that aligned mostly with previous 
cultural and historical relations.  
The major change of Brazil was appearing to align its security interest with the 
United States occurred when, fast-forwarding 20 years from the beginning to the end of 
the study, Brazil’s frigates sailed for peace efforts in Lebanon at the request of the UNSC. 
While the United States was occupied elsewhere in the Middle East, it appears Brazil’s 
global security interest as well as advancement in gaining recognition and legitimacy are 
bringing both countries closer than the divergence that occurred after the 9/11 attacks. For 
regional security engagement within the OAS, a major change in Brazil’s view on security 
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efforts by the United States in Haiti had occurred from U.S. involvement in 1994 and 
almost ten years later Brazil’s involvement in 2003. A divergence in military security 
relations appeared to occur in the early 1990s around the United States involvement in the 
OAS peace mission in Haiti as Brazil warned of violating sovereignty but then years later 
had finally been in a position to engage themselves. While the security institution had 
presented itself as another denominator of importance, it also appears that Brazil’s 
engagement in 2004 may have been a culmination of economic stability as well as the 
autonomy of the executive (Silva) to advance the country’s influence in regional stability. 
This was favored by Washington as the United States involvement in the GWOT was 
increasing.  
In sum, an indication to change in military security relations between both 
countries’  was not only a result of their involvement in the institutions. That involvement 
also included Brazil’s economic development as well as the country’s executive leadership 
decision in foreign policy, that when combined appear to show a change in military security 
relations. To reiterate, relevance and importance of the institutions themselves, over the 
time period observed, remained a viable option for both countries to participate. The 
influence of the other hypotheses discussed also appears to be intertwined within the 
significance of how both countries’ involvement in regional and international security 
institutions indicated a change in military security relations.  
B. BRAZIL, UNITED STATES, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION  
The last Great Power Competition revolved around the Cold War, in which the 
United States foreign policy and military interest appeared to solely revolve around NATO 
and containment of the USSR. For Brazil, during that time it was a military led country 
that remained relatively isolated in its international presence both economically and 
diplomatically. Post-Cold-War for the United States resulted in establishing renewed 
global dominance through advancing economic and military governance through trade 
pacts and coalition-led security initiatives. For Brazil, the ability to participate in both 
economic establishments, and global security institutions, was highly dependent on 
economic stability within their domestic economy, noted in Chapter II, as well as 
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opportunities in greater autonomy of the executive branch to influence foreign policy as 
noted in Chapter III. As long as the institutions discussed in Chapter IV are viable and 
relevant, Brazil’s increasing involvement and modernization of its military capability will 
be an avenue for the United States to advance mutual military security relations.  
In sum, this thesis found that Brazil’s economic stability, diplomatic decisions, and 
involvement in international and regional security institutions have evolved over the period 
covered in their importance to alluding a change in military security relations. 
Acknowledging how these factors may influence GPC in years to come also presents itself 
as relevant and should be analyzed. Additionally, of all three hypotheses presented, it 
appears the foreign policy decisions by leadership of Brazil may have a larger impacting 
role on relations between both countries. Despite economic stability achieved over the time 
period observed, diplomatic relations between both countries’ appear to have followed by 
increased arms sales, involvement in military exercises, as well as international and 
regional security efforts. A present-day example of the importance of foreign policy 
decisions of leaders, is how Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro visited the United States 
Southern Commander Admiral Craig S. Faller in Miami on March 8, 2020.284  At this visit, 
both parties agreed to advancing defense technology and improve joint military 
modernization efforts of both countries.285 Significance here lies not only in the 
advancement of military security relations, but that this was the first time a Brazilian Head 
of State has visited U.S. Southern Command.286 Also, it may be in the best interest of the 
United States to enlist greater cooperation with their south-south partner Brazil, as Brazil’s 
position in this GPC today is much more different—economically, diplomatically, and its 
involvement in security institutions—than its position during the Cold War.  




C. FURTHER RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future research on how involvement of the United States and Brazil in the UNSC 
and the OAS display changes in military security relations should be done. Unfortunately, 
a recommendation given here is to take into account the overall time required to display 
change in the hypotheses discussed as it appears to be the largest challenge. Even only after 
a study as long as 26 years is there a display of minor relevance of both countries’ 
involvement in these institutions toward advancing greater military security relations, but 
in relation to time, small implications of change may be multiplied over the span of 30 to 
50 years. Also, variables unforeseen in future research may be how much attention state 
and non-state actors will demand from both the United States and Brazil as each country 
answers UNSC and OAS mandates for peace operations.  
While the time period observed appears to provide satisfactory examples and data 
in the areas discussed, more research will help to develop a greater understanding in the 
dynamics of military security relations. Delving more into Brazilian economic 
development that may support a larger and increasingly more modernized military force 
could display future changes in military security relations between both countries. Equally, 
while both countries’ executive leadership decisions in foreign policy are continually 
ebbing and flowing as a result of domestic and international circumstances, close attention 
in research over future engagements between these countries could extend implications 
toward a changing dynamic in military security relations.  
Although, certainly concentrating a greater focus on Brazilian economic 
development as well as decisions in foreign policy by both countries, understanding each 
country’s involvement in international and regional security institutions may be important. 
Seeing each country’s involvement into these institutions can also lend itself to the 
importance of understanding how they may converge or diverge in military security 
relations as a result of the areas discussed. Lastly, leadership of both countries should be 
concerned with how the discussed hypotheses could change over another 26 or more years 
as it appears the reemergence of Great Power Competition can set another cycle of pre and 
post-Cold War era relations.  
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